Counter Insurgency Anyone??

[welsh]

In December the Army and Marines let go the new manual on Counter Insurgency Operations.

It's publically available and nearly 300 pages long (with index, appendix and everything else!)

"So you got nothing to read in Iraq? Little short on reading materials in Afghanistan? Your Penthouse got nabbed by someone..."

Want it?
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf

And what do people think of it?

Slates review of teh July "final draft"- since updated in December.

Counterinsurgency by the Book
The lessons of a new Army Field Manual.
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Saturday, July 8, 2006, at 7:09 AM ET
Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus
Two messages flutter between the lines of the U.S. Army's new field manual on counterinsurgency wars, its first document on the subject in 20 years.

Twenty Fucking years! What the Fuck?

One is that Pentagon planning for the Iraq war's aftermath was at least as crass, inattentive to the lessons of history, and contrary to basic political and military principles as the war's harshest critics have charged.

The other is that as a nation we may simply be ill-suited to fight these kinds of wars.

The field manual's chief authors—Lt. Gen. David Petraeus and retired Col. Conrad Crane—would never make these points explicitly. When Petraeus was commander of the 101st Airborne Division in Iraq, he combined combat power and community-building more astutely than any other officer. Crane, director of the Army's Military History Institute, is one of the leading scholars of "irregular warfare." They both support the war's aims. And they outline their new doctrine—or, rather, their revival of a very old doctrine—very thoughtfully and thoroughly.

Yet the undertone of this 241-page guidebook—not yet publicly released, but obtained by Steven Aftergood and posted this week on his Secrecy News Web site—is one of grim caution.

Counterinsurgency involves rebuilding a society, keeping the population safe, boosting the local government's legitimacy, training a national army, and fighting off insurgents who are trying to topple the government—all at the same time.

As the manual puts it, "The insurgent succeeds by sowing chaos and disorder anywhere; the government fails unless it maintains order everywhere."

Everywhere? That seems like a tall order. And perhaps a waste of resources. One would think the idea was to erode the influence of the insurgents over the population until they are without sanctuaries, and then vulnerable to destruction.

From first page to last, the authors stress that these kinds of wars are "protracted by nature." They require "firm political will and extreme patience," "considerable expenditure of time and resources," and a very large deployment of troops ready to greet "hand shakes or hand grenades" without mistaking one for the other.

"Successful … operations require Soldiers and Marines at every echelon to possess the following," the authors write. (Emphasis added.) They then list a daunting set of traits: "A clear, nuanced, and empathetic appreciation of the essential nature of the conflict. … An understanding of the motivation, strengths, and weaknesses of the insurgent," as well as rudimentary knowledge of the local culture, behavioral norms, and leadership structures. In addition, there must be "adaptive, self-aware, and intelligent leaders."

Another tall order?

Meanwhile, a single high-profile infraction can undo 100 successes. "Lose moral legitimacy, lose the war," the authors warn, pointedly noting that the French lost Algeria in part because their commanders condoned torture.

Abu Grab Ass anyone?

Two big questions emerge, without wading into the manual's tactical details. First, can American armed forces maintain such exacting standards over a long, hazy conflict? The all-volunteer U.S. military is full of extraordinarily smart, dedicated, and disciplined men and women. But the Army has also been lowering standards lately to meet recruitment targets.

Second, can American citizens and politicians maintain a long-term commitment to civil and insurgent wars at a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars and possibly thousands of lives, not just in Iraq or Afghanistan but anywhere? The question here isn't whether we should, but whether we can—whether the political system, with its competing demands and risk-averse tendencies, is capable of it.

The panel of officers and experts that put together the field manual had no mandate to address such political questions. But one consultant on the project (who spoke on condition of anonymity) told me, "If we did, we would have probably put in some caveat like: 'If the nation and its leaders are not prepared for the long hard fight that counterinsurgency entails, they should not begin it in the first place.' "

= lesson from Vietnam.

Certainly, one cause of the missteps in Iraq was that top U.S. officials failed to foresee that after Saddam Hussein fell, they might find themselves battling an insurgency. As recently as last November, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was still refusing to call the enemy "insurgents." The term, he said at a press conference, "gives them a greater legitimacy than they seem to merit."

The manual at one point lists some practices that have proved successful and unsuccessful in past counterinsurgency campaigns. Though the authors don't say so, the list came from a memo written in November 2004 by Kalev Sepp, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., who at the time was advising Gen. George W. Casey Jr., commander of Multinational Forces-Iraq.

It must have been obvious when he wrote it that U.S. forces had committed at least half of the "unsuccessful practices," among them: "Place priority on killing and capturing the enemy, not on engaging the population; … Concentrate military forces in large bases for protection; … Focus special operations forces primarily on raiding"; and "Ignore peacetime government processes, including legal procedures."

The manual cites other longstanding principles of counterinsurgency that U.S. planners and commanders violated, especially in the crucial early phases:

"The More Force Used, the Less Effective It Is."
"An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if the collateral damage or the creation of blood feuds leads to the recruitment of fifty more."
"Only attack insurgents when they get in the way. Try not to be distracted or forced into a series of reactive moves by a desire to kill or capture them. Provoking combat usually plays into the enemy's hands."
"A defection is better than a surrender, a surrender better than a capture, and a capture better than a kill."
One page of the manual summarizes Napoleon's occupation of Spain in 1808:

Conditioned by the decisive victories at Austerlitz and Jena, Napoleon believed the conquest of Spain would be little more than a "military promenade." [He achieved] a rapid conventional military victory over Spain's armies but ignored the immediate requirement to provide a stable and secure environment for the people. … The French failed to analyze the history, culture, and motivations of the Spanish people, or to seriously consider their potential to support or hinder the achievement of French political objectives. Napoleon's cultural miscalculation resulted in a protracted struggle that lasted nearly six years and ultimately required approximately three-fifths of the French Empire's total armed strength.

And probably resulted in more deaths to the French than the British fighting out of Portugual?

The authors don't mention it, but no reader could miss the parallel to Rumsfeld and Iraq.

A debate has been raging in some circles over whether the war's disasters were avoidable or inevitable. Would a smarter U.S. strategy have produced a more stable Iraq? Or were the long-suppressed sectarian feuds destined to gush forth like a geyser, no matter how we tried to control them, once Saddam was blown from his throne?

A better question provoked by this new Army Field Manual: Should we follow the authors' advice in the hope of waging a better counterinsurgency the next time around? Or should we give up these sorts of wars as futile and—do what instead?

If you give up these wars as futile, what are the military forces going to do instead? Might as well forget peacekeeping, and forget that whole imperialism business.

Those planning on going in the military- best to pick up a "how to speak Arabic in 8 weeks" course.

What does the military think of this?

From Armed Forces Journal-

"Originally, this column was going to dissect the deplorable Sept. 21 draft of FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency" (MCWP 3-33.5 for the Marine Corps), which appeared to have been written by Bono, two Woodstock survivors and one disgruntled Vietnam vet. A guide to failure and the waste of American lives, the draft troubled me more than anything produced by the Army since I joined as a private in 1976. It broadly ignored our real enemies — religious zealots and ethnic supremacists — in favor of PC analysis that interprets all insurgencies as Maoist in nature. Not only is that absurd — the brief age of ideology is over and we're now back in the historical mainstream of rebellions of blood and belief — but it's willfully absurd. In the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the drafters insisted on the enduring validity of models with which they were comfortable, such as Malaya or the early years of Vietnam. They want to study head colds while the Black Death is raging.

With a skin-them-alive-and-gut-them critique already written, I was assured that corrective action is being taken to produce a more sensible final document. To give the garrison Army a chance to prove it can deliver doctrine that might actually help our soldiers in the field, I'm holding my fire. But when that finalized manual appears, let's hope there's at least a single mention of suicide bombers and a few words about religious zealots and ethnic supremacists (neither of whom were included in the draft's categorization of insurgent types).

That Sept. 21 draft's keystone chapter offers 12 lengthy paragraphs that deal with Maoist insurgencies and two — count 'em yourself — brief references to either Osama bin Laden or al-Qaida and other faith-fueled terrorist movements. The Bolshevik Revolution got equal treatment with two paragraphs ("Back to Vladivostok, Wolfhounds!"). Baghdad was mentioned only once, ranking our experience there as equal in importance to the example of Che Guevara (whom we probably will not be fighting in the near future).

The document's misdiagnosis of the threat, faulty prescriptions and general incoherence appeared to result from drafters defending their doctoral theses, others who were prisoners of narrow educations and poor reading habits (T.E. Lawrence, an English neurotic who liked to dress up in flowing gowns and play spin-the-bottle with Bedouins, gets three citations in the keystone chapter and haunts the entire manual), and the pervasive atmosphere of political correctness that has conquered so much of our military and civilian leadership. "

Elsewhere- Military.com

Beginning to Learn
William Lind | August 24, 2006
Of all the many disappointments of America's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, perhaps the saddest has been the American military's seeming inability to learn, at least as institutions. Partly, this stems from the Bush Administration's proud refusal to learn and adapt; as the old Russian saying goes, a fish rots from the head. Partly, it has been the inward focus that characterizes Second Generation armed services. That inward focus, and the "not invented here" attitude it legitimizes, seems to lie behind the American services' rejection of the Four Generations framework (hilariously, the U.S. Army labeled it a "Marine Corps concept," while the Marines reject it because it is not).

Perhaps that is beginning to change. The Okhrana recently supplied me with a copy of a draft field manual, FM 3-24/FMFM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, which is being written jointly by the Army and the Marine Corps (which is no small achievement in itself). The draft is thoughtful, useful, and frank about the difficulties armed forces designed for conventional wars have when facing insurgencies.

The bulk of its contents is material drawn from the long history of counterinsurgency (more often than not a history of failure). Nothing wrong with that; history must always be the starting point in attempts to understand war, and most other things as well. The manual's authors have done their homework, and if one may lament how much of the manual represents a recovery of lessons learned at a painful price in Vietnam and then thrown away, at least they are here being restored. More than one chapter ends by stressing the need to learn and adapt, with a hint that we have not done too well at that.

The authors understand the imperative of a Third Generation culture for any armed service that hopes to fight insurgents with success. The manual stresses decentralization and initiative, as it should. One particularly good passage comes early in Appendix A:

A-8. Work the problem collectively with subordinate leaders. Discuss ideas and explore possible solutions. Once all understand the situation, seek a consensus on how to address it. If this sounds un-military, get over it. Such discussions help subordinates understand the commander's intent.... Corporals and privates will have to make quick decisions that may result in actions with strategic implications. Such circumstances require a shared situational understanding and a leadership climate that encourages subordinates to assess the situation, act on it, and accept responsibility for their actions. Employing mission command is essential in this environment.

General Hans von Seekt could not have put it better himself.

Counterinsurgency, while it does talk at times about an environment with multiple opponents, still falls into the common error of thinking that counterinsurgency and 4GW are the same, which they are not. That is no surprise.

But the draft does hold two surprises. The first is a remarkable discussion, in the first chapter, of the "Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency." This is a clear break with Second Generation thinking, which acknowledges only problems and solutions (the latter always kinetic). The paradoxes include "The More You Protect Your Force, The Less Secure You Are;" "The More Force Used, The Less Effective It Is;" "Sometimes Doing Nothing Is The Best Reaction;" "The Best Weapons For COIN Do Not Shoot;" and "Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing." The parallels here to the Austro-Hungarian FMFM 1-A, Fourth Generation War, are clear and suggest someone has read it, although it is not listed in the bibliography (NIH again?). By the Pleistocene standards of American doctrine development, this is breathtaking progress.

The second surprise is less happy. As is to be expected, the manual draws heavily on the ongoing American experience in Iraq. While occasionally suggesting that mistakes have been made ("Programs should be developed to prevent the formation of a class of impoverished and disgruntled former officers and soldiers who have lost their livelihood"), it often prescribes more of what we are now doing. Uh, excuse me guys, but most of what we are doing is not working. Perhaps we will not be able to confront that fact until the Iraq war is over, but a field manual that does not confront it cannot be more than a way station along the road we must eventually travel to its bitter end.

A remarkable historical vignette on page 4-1 of the draft does recognize, between the lines, what that end will be. Titled "Napoleon in Spain ," it reads in part:

Napoleon's campaign included a rapid conventional victory over Spanish armies but ignored the immediate requirement to provide a stable and secure environment for the people and the countryside.

The French should have expected ferocious resistance. The Spanish people were accustomed to hardship, suspicious of foreigners, and constantly involved in skirmishes with security forces. The French failed to analyze the history, culture, and motivations of the Spanish people, or to seriously consider their potential to support or hinder the achievement of French political objectives. Napoleon's cultural miscalculation resulted in a protracted struggle.... The Spanish resistance drained the Empire's resources and was the beginning of the end of Napoleon's reign.

Comments?