Since welsh hasn't posted on this, I will, with the appropriate Economist article:
How it happened
Jul 22nd 2004
From The Economist Global Agenda
The commission on the September 11th attacks has finally issued its report, with plenty of blame to go round. It also suggests a reorganisation of America’s intelligence services. Both the assessment of the past and the recommendations for the future will become big issues in the election campaign
Reuters
A necessary but painful read
THE build-up was like that of a summer blockbuster movie. For 20 months, the commission investigating the September 11th 2001 attacks on America has gathered evidence, interviewed witnesses and deliberated. Leaks in the press functioned as previews, giving the world a taste of the final product. A massive roll-out campaign for the day of publication, Thursday July 22nd, was planned, with a press conference and the distribution of copies to bookstores around America that same day.
With so much lead-up, there were few surprises in the report itself. President George Bush met the commission’s chairman and vice-chairman just before the report was released, and thanked them for their “very solid, sound recommendations”. In his press conference afterwards, the chairman, Thomas Kean, said that the Bush administration had already done much to make the country more secure since the attacks. But he delivered the commission’s most urgent verdict in four simple words: “We are not safe.”
The main product of the report is a recommendation for a new national intelligence director, co-ordinating the 15 agencies that currently collect intelligence and sitting in the cabinet. A similar job currently belongs—nominally—to the head of the CIA, who is also the “director of central intelligence”. But the report found that information-sharing between the agencies has been poor. If the various intelligence and law-enforcement bodies had only connected the available dots, the September 11th plot might just have been foiled (though the report does not say that this was reasonable or likely).
The proposal has its critics. The acting head of the CIA, John McLaughlin, said this week that a new director for intelligence would add a layer of bureaucracy without improving effectiveness. Others believe that putting the intelligence boss in the cabinet will make him too close to the White House. Reflecting similar concern, Mr McLaughlin recommended that the CIA’s head be given a fixed term in office, out of phase with presidential terms, so that he can be safely non-political. Finally, there is the worry that creating a single intelligence head would exacerbate the problem of “group think”, where intelligence officers in a single structure do not challenge one another’s assumptions. This was faulted in a scathing recent Senate report on the intelligence leading up to the Iraq war.
But the proposal for an intelligence shake-up also has many supporters. Among them is John Kerry, Mr Bush’s Democratic rival in this November’s presidential election. Mr Kerry has come out in favour of a national intelligence director, with budgetary authority (crucial in keeping troops in line) over the 15 different agencies. And the Bush administration was quick to emphasise that Mr McLaughlin’s critical comments on the proposal were made in a personal capacity. As for Mr Bush himself, he is clearly keeping his options open.
One option is the creation of a domestic intelligence agency, similar to Britain’s MI5. But the commission did not recommend such a move. Instead, it backed the creation of a dedicated team within the FBI, including linguists and experts in surveillance, devoted to countering the threat of terrorism. In introducing this proposal, the commission’s vice-chairman, Lee Hamilton, stressed the need to protect Americans’ civil liberties, even as he called for greater watchfulness.
The blame game
The report did not merely make recommendations—most of its almost 600 pages are devoted to the question of how the September 11th attacks happened in the first place. It cites ten “operational opportunities” that, if seized, could have foiled the plot. Four of them came under Bill Clinton, and six under Mr Bush. But the commission, made up of five Republicans and five Democrats, avoided pointing the finger at either man’s administration—while there was plenty of blame to go round, it was evenly spread.
Until now, attention has focused on a classified presidential memo of August 2001—a month before the attacks—warning that Osama bin Laden was determined to strike in America. Mr Bush’s critics used this as proof that his administration was taking terror seriously in its first year. But the commission’s report also notes that Mr Clinton received a memo in 1998 suggesting that Mr bin Laden hoped to hijack aircraft in order to free the ringleaders of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre. Mr Clinton did no more to stop airborne terrorism than his successor.
On other counts, the report could be damaging to Mr Bush, especially regarding his grand strategy in the war on terror. The report found contacts, but no “collaborative relationship”, between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Mr Bush had linked the war in Iraq to the war on terror; the unravelling of the mooted relationship between Saddam Hussein and militant Islamists could convince more Americans that the war was a mistake.
The report does, though, make an unsettling connection between the terrorists and another member of the “axis of evil”, Iran. Ten of the September 11th hijackers, it suggests, may have passed through Iran without having their passports stamped—thus making it easier for them to get into America. The report does not suggest that Iran’s leaders knew about the September 11th plot. But it may give Mr Kerry a chance to say that Mr Bush was not going after the biggest threat to America when he invaded Iraq. Mr Kerry advocates cautious engagement with Iran, in contrast to the Bush administration’s hard line. Iran, with its dodgy nuclear programme (which it insists is for civilian use only) and its support for militant groups like Hizbullah, could become an election issue.
That terrorism will be an issue in the election is clear, but it is less clear whom it favours. Mr Bush currently has an advantage on the issue in the polls—51% to 42%, according to a Washington Post poll last week. But the number has fluctuated somewhat—about a month ago, the two men were tied. How they seize on the 9/11 report will be crucial. Will Mr Bush support the report’s recommendations and create a national terror directive during the last months of this term? The speaker of the House of Representatives, Denny Hastert, has cast doubt that there is enough time left in the legislative calendar to push through any major reforms before the election. But the ten commission members insist that they will not simply let the report sit on a shelf, as with so many reports in the past. They plan to lobby extensively to see their proposals put into practice.
If Mr Bush makes a strong push for reform before November, it will be tough for Mr Kerry to distinguish himself on intelligence issues. He could be forced to resort to promising fewer foreign-policy mistakes, like the Iraq war and the alienation of America’s allies that accompanied it. Most Americans have already made up their minds—there are fewer undecided voters at this point in the campaign than in any election in recent history. For those few that are left, Mr Bush and Mr Kerry will use the report’s findings to court them on the most existential issue of all: which of the two men will best protect them from another day of horror like September 11th.
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2946839
So, let's summarize:
Both Clinton and Bush failed. Bush went after the wrong guy (and with false pretenses, I can't help saying that, even though it wasn't actually in the report). Oh, and the inteligence agencies suck huge ass as well.
How it happened
Jul 22nd 2004
From The Economist Global Agenda
The commission on the September 11th attacks has finally issued its report, with plenty of blame to go round. It also suggests a reorganisation of America’s intelligence services. Both the assessment of the past and the recommendations for the future will become big issues in the election campaign
Reuters
A necessary but painful read
THE build-up was like that of a summer blockbuster movie. For 20 months, the commission investigating the September 11th 2001 attacks on America has gathered evidence, interviewed witnesses and deliberated. Leaks in the press functioned as previews, giving the world a taste of the final product. A massive roll-out campaign for the day of publication, Thursday July 22nd, was planned, with a press conference and the distribution of copies to bookstores around America that same day.
With so much lead-up, there were few surprises in the report itself. President George Bush met the commission’s chairman and vice-chairman just before the report was released, and thanked them for their “very solid, sound recommendations”. In his press conference afterwards, the chairman, Thomas Kean, said that the Bush administration had already done much to make the country more secure since the attacks. But he delivered the commission’s most urgent verdict in four simple words: “We are not safe.”
The main product of the report is a recommendation for a new national intelligence director, co-ordinating the 15 agencies that currently collect intelligence and sitting in the cabinet. A similar job currently belongs—nominally—to the head of the CIA, who is also the “director of central intelligence”. But the report found that information-sharing between the agencies has been poor. If the various intelligence and law-enforcement bodies had only connected the available dots, the September 11th plot might just have been foiled (though the report does not say that this was reasonable or likely).
The proposal has its critics. The acting head of the CIA, John McLaughlin, said this week that a new director for intelligence would add a layer of bureaucracy without improving effectiveness. Others believe that putting the intelligence boss in the cabinet will make him too close to the White House. Reflecting similar concern, Mr McLaughlin recommended that the CIA’s head be given a fixed term in office, out of phase with presidential terms, so that he can be safely non-political. Finally, there is the worry that creating a single intelligence head would exacerbate the problem of “group think”, where intelligence officers in a single structure do not challenge one another’s assumptions. This was faulted in a scathing recent Senate report on the intelligence leading up to the Iraq war.
But the proposal for an intelligence shake-up also has many supporters. Among them is John Kerry, Mr Bush’s Democratic rival in this November’s presidential election. Mr Kerry has come out in favour of a national intelligence director, with budgetary authority (crucial in keeping troops in line) over the 15 different agencies. And the Bush administration was quick to emphasise that Mr McLaughlin’s critical comments on the proposal were made in a personal capacity. As for Mr Bush himself, he is clearly keeping his options open.
One option is the creation of a domestic intelligence agency, similar to Britain’s MI5. But the commission did not recommend such a move. Instead, it backed the creation of a dedicated team within the FBI, including linguists and experts in surveillance, devoted to countering the threat of terrorism. In introducing this proposal, the commission’s vice-chairman, Lee Hamilton, stressed the need to protect Americans’ civil liberties, even as he called for greater watchfulness.
The blame game
The report did not merely make recommendations—most of its almost 600 pages are devoted to the question of how the September 11th attacks happened in the first place. It cites ten “operational opportunities” that, if seized, could have foiled the plot. Four of them came under Bill Clinton, and six under Mr Bush. But the commission, made up of five Republicans and five Democrats, avoided pointing the finger at either man’s administration—while there was plenty of blame to go round, it was evenly spread.
Until now, attention has focused on a classified presidential memo of August 2001—a month before the attacks—warning that Osama bin Laden was determined to strike in America. Mr Bush’s critics used this as proof that his administration was taking terror seriously in its first year. But the commission’s report also notes that Mr Clinton received a memo in 1998 suggesting that Mr bin Laden hoped to hijack aircraft in order to free the ringleaders of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre. Mr Clinton did no more to stop airborne terrorism than his successor.
On other counts, the report could be damaging to Mr Bush, especially regarding his grand strategy in the war on terror. The report found contacts, but no “collaborative relationship”, between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Mr Bush had linked the war in Iraq to the war on terror; the unravelling of the mooted relationship between Saddam Hussein and militant Islamists could convince more Americans that the war was a mistake.
The report does, though, make an unsettling connection between the terrorists and another member of the “axis of evil”, Iran. Ten of the September 11th hijackers, it suggests, may have passed through Iran without having their passports stamped—thus making it easier for them to get into America. The report does not suggest that Iran’s leaders knew about the September 11th plot. But it may give Mr Kerry a chance to say that Mr Bush was not going after the biggest threat to America when he invaded Iraq. Mr Kerry advocates cautious engagement with Iran, in contrast to the Bush administration’s hard line. Iran, with its dodgy nuclear programme (which it insists is for civilian use only) and its support for militant groups like Hizbullah, could become an election issue.
That terrorism will be an issue in the election is clear, but it is less clear whom it favours. Mr Bush currently has an advantage on the issue in the polls—51% to 42%, according to a Washington Post poll last week. But the number has fluctuated somewhat—about a month ago, the two men were tied. How they seize on the 9/11 report will be crucial. Will Mr Bush support the report’s recommendations and create a national terror directive during the last months of this term? The speaker of the House of Representatives, Denny Hastert, has cast doubt that there is enough time left in the legislative calendar to push through any major reforms before the election. But the ten commission members insist that they will not simply let the report sit on a shelf, as with so many reports in the past. They plan to lobby extensively to see their proposals put into practice.
If Mr Bush makes a strong push for reform before November, it will be tough for Mr Kerry to distinguish himself on intelligence issues. He could be forced to resort to promising fewer foreign-policy mistakes, like the Iraq war and the alienation of America’s allies that accompanied it. Most Americans have already made up their minds—there are fewer undecided voters at this point in the campaign than in any election in recent history. For those few that are left, Mr Bush and Mr Kerry will use the report’s findings to court them on the most existential issue of all: which of the two men will best protect them from another day of horror like September 11th.
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2946839
So, let's summarize:
Both Clinton and Bush failed. Bush went after the wrong guy (and with false pretenses, I can't help saying that, even though it wasn't actually in the report). Oh, and the inteligence agencies suck huge ass as well.
