america vs. the world- blind americanism continued

[welsh]

Web site-
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2172130

SURVEY: AMERICA

Politics as warfare

Nov 6th 2003
From The Economist print edition


American politics has become more partisan, and nastier

THE 2000 election was the third dead-heat in a row. In votes for the House of Representatives, the widest margin of victory between 1996 and 2000 was a mere 1.3 percentage points. Essentially, every presidential and House election came out at a dead heat, 49:49.

The 2002 mid-term elections brought a change. In House races, Republicans won 51% of the popular vote, Democrats 46%. As Michael Barone, a political journalist, points out, statistically this margin was not significant, but politically it had a big impact. Republicans captured the Senate, the first time the president's party had ever won the upper chamber at this point in the electoral cycle. They gained 141 seats in statehouses, giving Republicans a majority of state legislators for the first time since 1952. The party kept its majority among state governors. In Washington, it controlled both houses of Congress and the presidency. The victory was highly unusual: most mid-term elections punish the incumbent party, especially at times of economic weakness. But does it presage a bigger electoral breakthrough, the beginning of the end of the 50-50 nation?

It might. Ever since the New Deal, there have been more registered Democrats than Republicans. In the four years before September 11th, according to the Pew Research Centre, Democrats held a small advantage in party identification (34% of registered voters described themselves as Democrats, 28% as Republicans). But immediately after the terrorist attacks Democratic affiliation dropped sharply, and in the past two years the parties have been roughly balanced. There was a further rise in Republican identification after the Iraq war earlier this year, so at the moment Republicans have an advantage in party identification for only the second time in 75 years (see chart 5). September 11th seems to have been a turning point.

But long-term trends were helping Republicans anyway. The defection of the South—America's most populous region—broke up the old Democratic coalition. In 2002, Republicans won the South by an even larger margin than in their landslide victory of 1994. The rise of an investor class (half of Americans own shares) benefits the party, because middle-class shareholders tend to back Republican causes such as privatising Social Security, the federal pensions system.

These long-term trends are reinforced by significant temporary gains. The campaign-finance reform of 2002 shifted the balance of advantage towards the party that raises more cash from individuals, which currently means the Republicans. Sophisticated computer software has turned redistricting—the ability of the dominant party in state assemblies to gerrymander district boundaries—from an art into a science. In 2002, Republicans controlled the legislatures of three big states—Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania. By amazing coincidence, in Gore-majority districts where Republicans drew new boundaries, their party won 11 more seats than in 2000.

So it is not hard to see why Republican strategists think their party may be on the verge of breaking the 50-50 deadlock. Yet, on balance, the evidence is still against the idea that there has been a fundamental shift in electoral politics. The 2002 elections did not break the mould. For incumbents to gain as much as Republicans did last year is unusual but not unprecedented. Democrats also won against the odds in 1998. And as Gary Jacobson of the University of California at San Diego points out, the Republicans' success in 2002 can be largely explained by special factors.

At that point, Mr Bush's personal ratings—the highest of any president—ran well ahead of his ratings on the economy. Usually the two do not differ much. That implies that but for the war on terrorism, which buoyed up his overall popularity, Mr Bush would not have been able to shield Republican candidates from economic discontent. This is unlikely to apply in 2004. Mr Bush's popularity also scared off the Democrats, who fielded a particularly feeble bunch of challengers. They have a few more creditable ones now.

Usually, incumbent parties lose seats in mid-term elections because congressmen squeak into marginal seats on the coat-tails of a successful president. But Mr Bush had no coat-tails in 2000, so in 2002 Republicans had fewer vulnerable seats to lose. Add in the special impact of redistricting, and most of the Republican success in 2002 can be explained by the party's skills in squeezing the most out of a largely balanced electorate rather than by a fundamental shift in its favour. There was little evidence that voters were less polarised in 2002 than they had been in 1996-2000.

Opposites repel
In one sense, that does not matter. If Mr Bush hopes a permanent majority is within his grasp, he may well dash ahead with an ambitious agenda. But he may also do that if he fears the partisan divide is too deep to be overcome. If so, his party's current political dominance would be just a window of opportunity, and he should take advantage of it before it closes.

But the persistence of a deep electoral division effects how his policies—or any president's policies—are received and carried out. It tempts Mr Bush (or any Republican) to push for more extreme policies, and any Democrat to push for the opposite extreme. The divide also encourages partisan behaviour among voters. This increasing polarisation could turn out to be the most important trend in American politics today.

George Wallace, a former governor of Alabama, used to say there wasn't a dime's worth of difference between the parties. But polarisation is growing in Congress. Republicans are now twice as likely to toe the party line in the House and Senate as they were in 1975. Democrats are about one-and a half times as likely. Ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” have become much rarer in domestic politics.

Partisanship is rife in congressional committees. Heads of committees used at least to pay lip service to the minority party when proposing legislation, but since Newt Gingrich's takeover in 1994, partisan control has by and large been the rule. Committee chairmen now routinely squelch attempts by Democrats to influence legislation, leading to petty squabbling and ill temper.

Partisanship is also evident in redistricting, which has increased the number of safe seats towards North Korean levels. In 2004, only 30-40 congressional seats are likely to be truly competitive—a quarter of the number in the 1990s. Since 1964, the share of House incumbents re-elected with over 60% of the vote has risen from 58% to 77%. This makes congressmen's politics more extreme.

If your district is rock-solid, you have little reason to fear that voters will kick you out for moving too far from their opinions. The main threat comes from party activists, who tend to be more extreme in their views and can propose a challenger in primary elections. So the dangers of drifting too far to the middle outweigh those of drifting too far to the extremes. Partisan redistricting marginalises centrist voters, aligns the views of candidates more closely with extremists on each side and radicalises politics.

Away from Capitol Hill, partisanship has also grown in lobbying. Both parties have tried to control lobbyists, the fourth branch of American government, but Republicans have got better at it than Democrats. Every Tuesday, lobbyists troop to the office of Rick Santorum, the leader of the Senate Republican conference, to talk about hiring Republicans—an ex-chief of staff here, a pollster there. Republicans place their protégés in lobbying firms. The firms raise money for Republican candidates and help get them elected. Legislators then place their protégés in the firms. And so it goes on.

Above all, polarisation has grown in the electorate, evidenced by a sharp decline in split-ticket voting (choosing a president from one party and a congressional representative from another). In 1972, 44% of congressmen and women represented a different party from the one whose presidential candidate carried their district. In 2000, the share was under 20%.

The truly independent voter seems to be disappearing. That may seem curious, because those who call themselves independents easily outnumber self-identified Democrats or Republicans. Yet most so-called independents vote consistently one way or the other. The White House reckons that less than one-third of independent voters actually switched parties in the past three elections.

With the decline of swing voters, there seems less and less point in running presidential campaigns to appeal to the slim middle. Instead, elections have become contests to mobilise core supporters. The 2000 and 2002 elections were both turn-out races.

The upshot is that politics has become warfare. What matters most is the size and bloodthirstiness of your troops, not winning over neutrals. Politicians take the first opportunity to reach for weapons of mass destruction, such as Bill Clinton's impeachment or the recall of Governor Gray Davis in California. It is no longer possible to agree to disagree. Your enemies must be “Stupid White Men”, guilty of “Treason”, who live in a world of “Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them” (to quote the titles of three of this year's political bestsellers).

Increased partisanship has implications for the nature of America's public debate, the country's decentralised political tradition and Mr Bush himself. Politics as warfare is rooted in debates about fundamental issues. Over the past few years, the Republicans have become the “exceptionalist” party by celebrating America's traditional values and stressing qualities that make the country intrinsically different. Call that conservative exceptionalism.

In contrast, Democrats are divided. Mainstream Democrats, including members of the Clinton administration, go for the other type of exceptionalism, the city-on-a-hill variety—though Mr Bush claims to espouse that, too. Others—notably Howard Dean and the left—seem to regard exceptionalism of any kind as a bad thing. Still others embrace what might be called liberal exceptionalism, celebrating America's egalitarian, anti-aristocratic heritage. In different ways, all these distinctions are based on values or principles.

Steamrollering the enemy
In contrast, winning at all costs is not, or not necessarily. Take the 2002 Senate election in Georgia, one of the nastiest campaigns of recent memory. The Democrat, Max Cleland, who had lost three limbs in Vietnam, was demonised as soft on Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. The culture of victory may supersede arguments about values and substance because conquest becomes imperative.

America's political system is decentralised, with proud, distinctive traditions at state level, and national parties that used to be loose coalitions of diverse groups which banded together to win power. Partisanship, on the other hand, is a centralising force that encourages uniformity. America's distinctive political traditions have been tested before, and survived. In the early part of the 20th century, a time of just as much partisanship in voting and in politicians' behaviour, America did not move towards the party-dominated political systems familiar in Europe. But there was less ideological coherence then, and no television or national media groups to reinforce a consistent message.

Now localism is weaker. And, at least on the Republican side, it faces a national organisation more disciplined, more firmly under the control of the White House, more fiercely loyal to the president—and more prepared to throw its weight around. In the 2002 elections, the White House intervened to persuade local parties in Minnesota, South Dakota and Georgia to change their senatorial candidate. The White House's choice won in two of the three states against the odds.

This does not mean that party structures themselves have strengthened. In fact, in terms of raising money they are weaker than they have been throughout most of American history. But the parties are ideologically more distinct. And within the parties, politicians are more partisan and less diverse in their backgrounds.

As for Mr Bush himself, he has proved a polarising president, better at solidifying the Republican base than at extending it. Two years after September 2001, his own party's approval of him stood at over 80%, but Democratic approval had fallen below 20%. This stunning gap marks Mr Bush as even more divisive than Bill Clinton, who suffered just as much from Republicans' hostility as Mr Bush does from Democrats'. But whereas Mr Clinton's policies were more popular than he was, with Mr Bush it is the other way around. His ratings on the economy and tax cuts are lower than his overall approval levels. The next section explains why.

 

[Gwydion]

ONe person has absolute power(Yes, I know it's not absolute, but it's a lot of power), and can basically do a lot of things.

Actually, it's very far from absolute power. When Bush wants his budget approved, do you think it just happens? Congressmen hack it apart first, and make changes they think are necessary. When Bush says he supports a certain law, it isn't just instantly passed. It needs to be approved by both houses of Congress before he even gets a chance to sign it into law. It will probably be changed at least somewhat by both houses.

Even if Bush signs a bill into law, that doesn't guarantee it'll stick around. When the Supreme Court gave itself the power of judicial review in Marbury vs Madison, a means was created of negating laws already in place. Laws can be challenged based on Constitutional issues. If the Court rules that a law violates the Constitution, it cannot be enforced.

So, what can Bush do that Congress can't undo or change? Not a lot. Idiotic politicians with no understanding of the Constitution have essentially surrendered Congressional approval of long-term troop deployments, so Bush has pretty good control over the military. He can issue executive orders to do things like create more bureaucracy, as well. Other than that, he gets to pick senators if something gets to happen to the ones we already have. That's about it.

You see it right now, Bush is paying very heavily on nationalist and religious feelings, and due to THAT he is doing well. Not because of his policies, not because of his charisma(Because he has almost none), but because of what he shows, patriotism, and religon.

Mmm... Somewhat. He's really not doing well in the polls, though. Even though the economy will show marked recovery by the election, I think there's a pretty good chance he'll be defeated.

 

[welsh]

By the way, see the article posted at the bottom of page 1 if you missed it.


SURVEY: AMERICA

web site- http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2172181
Doctor Jekyll and Mr Bush

Nov 6th 2003
From The Economist print edition


How “exceptional” is George Bush?

FOR a moment, it seemed that the attacks of September 11th 2001 had created a new opportunity for political leadership. The mayor of New York, Rudolph Giuliani, transformed himself overnight from an effective, if cantankerous, administrator into a symbol of the resilient city. Mr Bush might have emulated him. Americans rallied round the president after the terrorist attacks. His speeches at the time expressed the mood of national determination. His stature as commander-in-chief grew. Yet Mr Bush made no real attempt to unify the nation behind a domestic cause. He made no call for sacrifice, as Franklin Roosevelt had done after Pearl Harbour. Asked what people could do for the nation at a time of crisis, Mr Bush replied: Go back to normal. Go shopping.

This could perhaps be regarded as a failure of the president's imagination. But there is another reason. President Bush says he wants to promote America's universal values. In that sense, he is a city-on-the-hill exceptionalist. He also claimed during the 2000 election campaign that he would be “a uniter, not a divider”. But his political personality is too complicated for either claim to be wholly convincing.

There are two George Bushes. One is ideological, divisive, willing to tear up the rule book and push strongly conservative policies. This is the Bush loved by Republicans, loathed by Democrats (see chart 6). The other is more incremental and sometimes more bipartisan. Yet even this Bush, who might appeal to the middle, is also surprisingly audacious. His audacity causes wariness among voters who are not strongly inclined for or against him.

Big-government conservatism
Foreign policy shows Mr Bush in rule-book-destroying mode. He has rejected the cornerstone of cold-war diplomacy, the doctrine of containment, and is unwilling to treat states as legitimate merely because they are internationally recognised or stable. This puts him at odds not only with European, but with cold-war traditions of American diplomacy.

In some areas of domestic policy, Mr Bush has been almost as far-reaching. The best example is tax. As Bill Galston of the University of Maryland puts it, “Ronald Reagan thought government was the problem. George Bush thinks tax is the problem.” Mr Bush is in fact more radical, or more determined, than his Republican predecessor. Mr Reagan cut taxes in his first year but increased them later in the face of widening budget deficits. Mr Bush cut them in each of his first three years, despite the prospect, by the third year, of deficits as far as the eye can see.

This year, total federal revenues stood at 17% of GDP, the lowest level since 1959, which was long before Medicare, Medicaid, federal education programmes and today's defence build-up. Mr Bush's tax policy is consistent with the “exceptionalist” view that, in a twist on Thomas Jefferson's words, “the government that governs best, taxes least.” It has heightened differences in the tax burden between the two sides of the Atlantic.

What about the other George Bush? This is the one who created the biggest new bureaucracy since Harry Truman: the Department of Homeland Security. This is the Bush who has pushed the powers of the federal government into education, hitherto a state preserve, by requiring annual testing of students and raising federal spending to supervise those tests. It is the one who has allowed the Justice Department to detain suspected terrorists for longer periods and with less judicial review.

This is the Bush who is trying to set up a national energy policy to reduce dependence on foreign oil; who slapped protectionist barriers on steel; who signed a farm bill costing $180 billion over ten years; who set up a White House office to promote marriage (surely the last thing a conservative government should be poking its nose into). And this is the one urging Congress to expand state health care for the elderly to cover some of the costs of prescription drugs—an action President Clinton's Medicare adviser says would be “the biggest expansion of government health benefits since the Great Society.”

In all, the Bush administration in its first three years increased government spending by 21%. It will rise even higher if the president wins a second term and fulfils his promise to reform Social Security, because of the huge transition costs. In contrast, during the Clinton administration government spending fell as a share of GDP. “Appalling,” says Ed Crane, the head of the libertarian Cato Institute which campaigns for small government.

This rise in the scope and cost of government seems to contradict the idea that American exceptionalism is increasing on Mr Bush's watch. Clearly, he is not an exceptionalist in the small-government, Reagan mould. He does not believe government is part of the problem. This qualifies, but does not rebut, the notion that exceptionalism is growing. Still less does it mean Mr Bush is making America's government more “European”.

The combination of large tax cuts and increased spending has turned a budget surplus of 2.4% ofGDP in 2000 into a 3.5% deficit in 2003—one of the fastest fiscal deteriorations in history. With more spending pressure, the proposed expansion of Medicare and the desire to make “temporary” tax cuts permanent, the deficit is likely to rise yet further, to around 5% of GDP by 2004-05, near the record post-war deficit set in 1983. This would almost certainly be unsustainable, so Mr Bush's economic policy must be counted a work in progress at best, a shambles at worst.

And even though Mr Bush is no small-government exceptionalist, he is no European-style welfare statist either. As Jonathan Rauch has argued in National Journal, a magazine for Washington insiders, the thread running through his non-defence government expansion is increased choice rather than increased government. Higher spending on school tests enables parents to assess the quality of schools and choose between them. Health-care reform as originally proposed is supposed to let private health providers compete with Medicare. Social Security reform, if it happens, would allow people to save for their own retirement through individual accounts that would compete with the existing pay-as-you-go system.

These two Bushes coexist uneasily. Neither is likely to dominate the other, because of the way the president runs his administration. Mr Bush has an MBA, and it shows. He sets overall goals but lets his lieutenants work out how to meet them and goes with the policy that best pleases him. Different policies, therefore, reflect different strands of Republicanism. Sometimes neo-conservatives have the president's ear; sometimes traditional realists do. Sometimes corporate barons seem uppermost; at other times, supply-siders. This fluidity makes for a dizzy, sometimes invigorating, often incoherent mixture.

Summing up
The conclusion must be that Mr Bush's policies are somewhat exceptionalist, increasing his appeal to the red states and reducing it in blue ones. At the same time, the combination of radical ambition and uncertain outcomes leaves voters in the middle nervously suspending judgment.

The president's radical policies and the growth of partisanship have increased the importance of extreme opinion and marginalised the centre. After September 11th, Mr Bush appealed strongly to traditional American patriotism. His tax policies appealed to small-government conservatism. Both implicitly encouraged exceptionalism. All this lessened the moderating influence of the middle.

Exceptionalism and partisanship reinforce one another. Exceptionalism exists anyway; partisanship increases its importance. Partisan politics is growing anyway; exceptionalism gives it character and spirit. By exaggerating existing divisions, Mr Bush seems to have hardened his country's battle lines. And they seem to have hardened him.


... Next article

 

[welsh]

Even if Bush signs a bill into law, that doesn't guarantee it'll stick around. When the Supreme Court gave itself the power of judicial review in Marbury vs Madison, a means was created of negating laws already in place. Laws can be challenged based on Constitutional issues. If the Court rules that a law violates the Constitution, it cannot be enforced.

While I generally agree with that principle, there are exceptions. I think it was Jackson who said of the Court on a policy (I am pretty sure it was the termination of the National Bank) that Jackson, then President, said "Mr. Marshal has made his rule, now let him enforce it."

Thus a few limits to the Court's power- the President can, on occassion, elect not to enforce a rule. Also Congress can often relegislate an issue although often it does so poorly and for political reasons- ie- the partial birth abortion legislation.

Mmm... Somewhat. He's really not doing well in the polls, though. Even though the economy will show marked recovery by the election, I think there's a pretty good chance he'll be defeated.

True, and if the economy recovers and people get jobs than I would think Mr. Bush has a fair chance of getting reelected. Much of that comes down to three issues-
(1) How the war in Iraq fairs
(2) Will there be a dramatic increase in jobs
(3) Can the Bush administration survive scandals.

 

[welsh]

Ok, last essay of the series- Hope you have enjoyed this.
Interesting title-

Oh and the web site is-
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2189175

The last, best hope of earth?

Nov 6th 2003
From The Economist print edition

American exceptionalism is a fact and a fate. It does not have to be a problem

IS AMERICAN exceptionalism something to worry about? Many people will say yes. Their concerns are understandable but overblown.

An increased sense of national distinctiveness in any big power must worry the small fry who live in its shadow. America's alliance with Europe kept millions of people free and wealthy during the cold war. To the extent that American assertiveness threatens that alliance, it also hurts something that has done immense good.

But the world has lived with American differences for two centuries. The suspicions surrounding their current revival are due in part to foreigners' shock at the end of the somewhat artificial closeness engendered by the cold war, and in part to the war in Iraq. As other countries begin to adjust to changes in America, and as profound disagreement over Iraq fades into milder wrangling about the occupation, alliances will be rebuilt. That is already beginning to happen.

Some of the features that make America different cause problems within the country because they are divisive. True, qualities such as Americans' optimism and their stress on individual responsibility encourage unity. But other features are more partisan, including religiosity, small-government conservatism and perhaps intense patriotism. America is already deeply divided between traditional and secular cultures. The increase of partisanship, the culture of political victory at all costs, Mr Bush's own policies and his enormous appeal to traditional America all risk making matters worse.

Yet the contest of values is a source of strength as well as weakness for America. New opinions are always bubbling up; elite views are always being tested. This is messy but not acquiescent. De Tocqueville argued that the most insidious threat to any democracy was apathy, which conducts people “by a longer, more secret, but surer path towards servitude.” America's culture wars help to bar that secret path.

And for everyone other than Americans themselves, the country's divisions should be less worrying. Doctrines of American exceptionalism tend to be self-regulating. Mr Bush stresses them and meets opposition from the left; a President Howard Dean would no doubt downplay them and meet opposition from the right.

In addition, there are two external constraints upon American exceptionalism. One is the sheer difficulty of engagement abroad. As problems pile up in Iraq, people at home will become ever less likely to support the idea that America has a unique mission in the world.

The other constraint is economic. At the moment, the world economy depends too heavily on American growth, and America depends too much on borrowing abroad. At some point, global economic imbalances will be corrected and, if things go well, growth in the rest of the world will begin to catch up with America's, making its economic performance less divergent from its partners'. Meanwhile, America's budget problems will constrain President Bush. In 2000, surpluses enabled him to make expansive, nation-changing promises. As the red ink flows, he is likely to be forced into small-scale, incremental promises for his second term.

In the end, though, American exceptionalism worries outsiders because it seems both to represent and encourage a more dangerous world. Doctrines of exceptionalism seem to fit with the notion that the post-cold-war world is a battleground of warring cultures and hostile ideologies, the “clash of civilisations”. In such a world, the anti-exceptionalist tenets of the European Union—that countries should play down their differences—seem to offer a safe haven. Exceptionalists reply that the world's conflicts are there for all to see, and that American power is likely to promote not chaos, but safety.

No one knows which of these ideas will be more influential in the world in future: America's top-dog exceptionalism or the EU's basket of squealing puppies. But for America itself, the choice has already been made. America is a nation apart in both senses: different from others, and divided within itself.

____

That's it.
There is an author interview here-
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2189175
if you are interested.

 

[Gwydion]

True, and if the economy recovers and people get jobs than I would think Mr. Bush has a fair chance of getting reelected. Much of that comes down to three issues-
(1) How the war in Iraq fairs
(2) Will there be a dramatic increase in jobs
(3) Can the Bush administration survive scandals.

That's true. I personally believe that his credibility is shot over the war in Iraq. If the fighting ends soon, like in 2 or three months, maybe he can still get reelected. If the attacks continue well into 2004, which seems more likely to me, I don't think he will get reelected.

 

[Wooz]

I think next year will be very interesting indeed. A lot of people will probably dig up or even fabricate bigtime scandals for president W.

For what concerns the "attacks" (I'd call it in my liberal pinko punk slang " imperialist occupation"), neither America nor its allies have said anything to move out of Iraq anytime soon. What's more, a lot of Polish companies are being hired to rebuild Iraqui infrastructure such as telecommunications, roads, canalizations and highways...

I think bush won't be reelected next year, but I'm pretty sure the next president will be a republican, for what I've read, heard and seen of the actual politic and social situation in the states.

What do you think?

 

[Bradylama]

We haven't said anything about moving out of Iraq because its impossible. There's too much work to be done just to leave the Iraqis up to their own devices.

 

[welsh]

I agree that much of this will depend on the war. If the US pulls it off then there is a good chance that he will be elected. That seems unlikely based on what we have seen so far. I agree with Gwyd on this. It is likely the attacks will continue and as long as they do, Bush is in trouble.

But there have also been a lot of folks who lost good jobs and the new jobs are kind of crappy. People who lost their old jobs only to find that they are making half of their salary are not going to be happy. Just like those who took a bath when the Stock Market bubble broke, are unhappy that their portfolio's have half the old value, there is a qualitative issue that matters. It's not just a matter of new jobs, but good jobs and opportunities for investment.

In that sense the debt is going to screw him. The higher the debt, the more that will have to be spent of paying off the debt, the more difficult the debt will be to repay. IN an earlier post we made the distinction between good and bad debt. Good debt being loans that you can repay and make progress on. Now it seems that the debt is getting out of control. Taxes get cut and yet more government spending = borrowing with less likelihood to repay. That kind of policy will make foreign investors look elsewhere for safer investments than the US.

THere also has to be a policy of exit in Iraq that isn't one of running away with our tail between our legs.

If I were Bush, I would be thinking more carefully on the idea of elections and the creation of political parties in Iraq. This would do a few important things. For one, it would be clear that the US is planning to leave and will put the onus on the Iraqis to come together on this issue to build a better state. It will also delegitimize those factions that seek to overthrow the US using an argument that the US is merely another colonial power that seeks to dominate Iraq for its oil. It might also bring more of the Iraqi population into a position where they have a vested interest in the kind of state they wish to have in the future.

It might also have the advantage of bringing the opposition out into the open and therefore more easily to contain or respond to.

The Brits did something similar in their colonial wars. In both Kenya and Malaysia, the Brits were heading out but didn't want to leave behind a war. By chaperoning the creation of a new government under a democratic form, and by allowing the locals to use parties to channel their political platforms, this moved the discourse towards the creation of a new state and deligitimized the use of violence as a means of resistance.

The danger for the US might also be that it would have to confront political resistance and in a sense is helping along the process of political organization and mobilization that might turn on the US.
That would be dangerous, but at the same time, there will have to be political parties sooner or later. Part of the secret of British colonial successes was due to the fostering of political parties, especially right of center parties that looked after the interests of local economic elites.

But even the danger of political parties could be contained if it was clearer that certain governing bodies would have elections. For example the governing counsel could become a matter of gradual elections, and there could be a move towards the creation of a legislative or executive counsel as a prelude to gaining full independence. Slowly the US could be seen as withdrawing from the political maintenance or stewardship of the country, and perhaps depart with only a small military presence to safeguard the government (much as France maintains forces in Africa to protect regimes from possible coups).

Therefore the US could control political opposition and channel it in ways that works to the long term advantage of the US and was consistent with the overall democratization project.

There is an added advantage. Most Americans don't see an end to Iraq. Because of the WoMD thing, many have lost their confidence in this government in being truthful. That's bad. Americans might be a trusting people, but if you ruin that trust they will turn on you. "No new taxes" worked again Bush Sr. not because he did raise taxes, but he lied when he said he wouldn't. I think a lot of Americans think Bush Jr. lied about the WoMD and stick with him now because it's a "we're in it now and have to see it through because pulling out would be worse in the end" (a similar logic to Vietnam).

By setting out a time line for withdraw which shows that there are dates in which elections are to be held and the transition towards allowing the Iraqis self rule is clear, Bush would be able to gain more crediability at home, in Iraq and abroad.

When all is said and done, Bush's numbers are not great, but the numbers usually aren't great for a President at this point in his presidency. He stands a fair chance of winning. Much will depend on what the Democrats can bring to the table.

 

[welsh]

I think next year will be very interesting indeed. A lot of people will probably dig up or even fabricate bigtime scandals for president W.

I think bush won't be reelected next year, but I'm pretty sure the next president will be a republican, for what I've read, heard and seen of the actual politic and social situation in the states.

What do you think?

THe republicans will run Bush because there are no other possible candidates. He's the incumbant and his numbers are good and so far I have not seen any opposition from within the party.

As for scandals- Frankly I am amazed that no one has raised any issues about Bush family ties to big business, where it gets its money from, special interests, or the like.

PRobably sex sells better in the US than business- a lesson from White Water.

 

[Paladin Solo]

Well most of the attacks in Iraq are coming from terrorists or some pissed of Sadam loyalists/bathists radicals. Most Iraqis in recent polls have said that they are grateful for the U.S. but want them to finish off the business of rebuilding Iraq as soon as possible. I agree with them, we need to get out of there as soon as we achieve our goals of rebuilding Iraq. On the plus side, once this is done, that's one more for democracy, and one less for tyranny. And we will have another ally as well as a good example of hope in the middle east, which we desperately need, not just the United States, but all people.

 

[Mohrg]

Oh noo, the goofy old guys in suit got King...NOOO!

Mohrg

 

[Paladin Solo]

No they didn't get to me. I am delighted that you would care though. Thanks.

 

[welsh]

MOhrg- you are so silly.

Ok, letters in response from the survey- what do you think?

Exceptional America
SIR – There is nothing either mysterious or nefarious about what your survey calls American “exceptionalism” (November 8th). Rather, America warrants attention because, in an age of globalisation with borders disintegrating, it is fast becoming the headquarters nation. What is remarkable about our age is the inexorable if unsteady advance of freedom of all kinds—free movement of trade, people and information. Everything and everyone gravitates towards America because it is the one place that facilitates and welcomes all those freedoms. So each year, America looks more like the world.

As an economic policy it is pretty good; we are packing the educated classes and the value added into our corner of the world, but it is not the result of any studied intent. Rather, it is the natural consequence of our being the only big nation founded not on race, ethnicity or religion, but on ideas—free will, free people and free enterprise. What you call American exceptionalism is rather the triumph of the human spirit of opportunity and hope. These are universal values, and it is only in explicitly embracing and enabling them that our country is, blessedly, exceptional. You're welcome.

Richard Sybert
San Diego, California

SIR – You neglect to mention sport, which is surely the most obvious example of American exceptionalism. Americans are hostile to sports that the rest of the world likes, such as soccer and cricket. There is some evidence that George Washington played cricket with his troops in the revolutionary war but in the 19th century—perhaps as a result of Britain's attack on Washington, DC, in 1814—we Americans became hostile to “foreign” sports. That hostility remained throughout the 20th century and was never questioned, even in the 1960s, the decade when supposedly we questioned everything.

After that came the culture wars, and both sides have tacitly agreed that sports will not be part of the debate. Neither the Eurocentric right nor the multicultural left want to abandon the Americentric environment in which baseball, American football and basketball flourish at the expense of foreign sports. In the 1970s, some of us turned to soccer, but those who did so are not those one might expect. The term “soccer mom” (rather than, say, “soccer liberal” or “soccer leftist”) indicates suburban families and not urban multiculturalists.

John Pepple
Gambier, Ohio
SIR – You cite John Winthrop's quote that America is a “city on a hill”, a figure of speech often used by, among others, Ronald Reagan. It is worth noting both that Winthrop made the speech containing this quote to his Puritan brethren on board a ship fleeing Europe en route to Massachusetts and that the quote harkens directly to the Sermon on the Mount. The quote not only reflects a sense that America occupies a special place in the world but also a responsibility to aspire to do good and not hide one's light under a bushel. The quote is often cited as an exhortation to communal responsibility and as a reminder that any special favour entrusted should not be squandered.

John Lawlor
Chicago
SIR – Surely you realise that September 11th was not “the first [strike] on the country's mainland by a foreign enemy.” What of the British burning Washington, DC, in 1814?

Peter Salus
Austin, Texas
SIR – You note that in some states, judges are elected. This is just the tip of the decentralised electoral iceberg. While travelling in rural Kentucky last summer, I was astounded to see posters inviting locals to vote for their next jailer.

Rob Carter
Chapel Hill, North Carolina

 

[Sander]

SIR – There is nothing either mysterious or nefarious about what your survey calls American “exceptionalism” (November 8th). Rather, America warrants attention because, in an age of globalisation with borders disintegrating, it is fast becoming the headquarters nation. What is remarkable about our age is the inexorable if unsteady advance of freedom of all kinds—free movement of trade, people and information. Everything and everyone gravitates towards America because it is the one place that facilitates and welcomes all those freedoms. So each year, America looks more like the world.

This is an interesting part, mostly because this guy(or gal) seems to think that America is the freeest country in the world. How wrong he is....

As an economic policy it is pretty good; we are packing the educated classes and the value added into our corner of the world, but it is not the result of any studied intent. Rather, it is the natural consequence of our being the only big nation founded not on race, ethnicity or religion, but on ideas—free will, free people and free enterprise. What you call American exceptionalism is rather the triumph of the human spirit of opportunity and hope. These are universal values, and it is only in explicitly embracing and enabling them that our country is, blessedly, exceptional. You're welcome.

I could partially agree with this, were it not that those values are publically embraced, but not factually. I'm quite certain that things such as the PATRIOT act and Guantanamo bay have little to do with the basic values America was founded on.

And I find it a bit silly that this guy(or gal) seems to think that only because the USA was founded on these principles, it will automaticallyu do better than other countries.

SIR – You neglect to mention sport, which is surely the most obvious example of American exceptionalism. Americans are hostile to sports that the rest of the world likes, such as soccer and cricket. There is some evidence that George Washington played cricket with his troops in the revolutionary war but in the 19th century—perhaps as a result of Britain's attack on Washington, DC, in 1814—we Americans became hostile to “foreign” sports. That hostility remained throughout the 20th century and was never questioned, even in the 1960s, the decade when supposedly we questioned everything.

After that came the culture wars, and both sides have tacitly agreed that sports will not be part of the debate. Neither the Eurocentric right nor the multicultural left want to abandon the Americentric environment in which baseball, American football and basketball flourish at the expense of foreign sports. In the 1970s, some of us turned to soccer, but those who did so are not those one might expect. The term “soccer mom” (rather than, say, “soccer liberal” or “soccer leftist”) indicates suburban families and not urban multiculturalists.

Hehe, nice one.

 

[Murdoch]

SIR – There is nothing either mysterious or nefarious about what your survey calls American “exceptionalism” (November 8th). Rather, America warrants attention because, in an age of globalisation with borders disintegrating, it is fast becoming the headquarters nation. What is remarkable about our age is the inexorable if unsteady advance of freedom of all kinds—free movement of trade, people and information. Everything and everyone gravitates towards America because it is the one place that facilitates and welcomes all those freedoms. So each year, America looks more like the world.

This is an interesting part, mostly because this guy(or gal) seems to think that America is the freeest country in the world. How wrong he is....

So who do you think is the most free country? I really asking not trying to be an ass.

Fact is the US allows its citizens to own businesses and run them with little oversight. Run for and give money to those running for office. It has stricter confidentiality rules than Europe. Imposes less taxes on its citizens than the EU. Believes its citizens are more capable of taking care of their own retirement than the EU (as evidenced by the less encompassing retirement system).

For all the US's faults, lack of freedom is not one of them, IMO.

 

[Sander]

I have to disagree, first of all, I'm not counting social security and the likes to freedom, because social security has little to do with personal freedom, for me.

Now, the USA gives a bit more freedom than other countries businesswise, however the USA gives less freedom on a personal level. The laws against marijuana are prepostorous, to say the least, and drinking at 21 is also bad. Then there's Guantanamo Bay and the US PATRIOT act, which is an abomination.

What's more, the voting system doesn't exactly show great faith in the people either.

For me, either the Netherlands, or Sweden would be "the land of freedom" although there is hardly a real land of freedom.

 

[welsh]

Not sure about Sweden.

But the reason why kids aren't allowed to drink before the age of 21 is because of drunk driving. Too many people were getting killed by irresponsible kids driving under the influence of alcohol. For awhile kids could drink over the age of 18. The rule was past as a matter of public safety. DWI laws have also become more extensive.

Reason is simple, in the US transportation is really about cars and covering distances. There are few corner pubs that one can go to, get sloshed and then come home.

But historically the age of majority in the US was 21. In some areas it still is- for instance in the areas of trusts and estates, often someone is deemed an adult only at age 21.

 

[Harlwquin]

Well america may be a free country but it seems that freedom stops at the US border. It seems that anyone not of the same mind with J.Bush (the sparkling intellect that he is) is condemned as an enemy of liberty, freedom etc etc. Take France, they didn't do anything bad they only had a different view on things... seems that thats a big nono in the US's book hence now we have in the US "freedom fries" and anti-french attitudes.

I for one find this kind of holyer that though behavior a bit arrogant to say the least. The hole with us or agenst us line of policy is just a kind way of blackmail for crying out loud. Is everyone supposed to agree with the US about everything? I agree that terrorism is a terrible thing but that doesn't mean I agree with what the US is doing about it, does that make me one of the bad guys? just because I have a difference of opinion? is this the US's idea of freedom? freedom for itself and condemnation for different opinions? Terrorism is a frightening terrible thing and I can see how frightened people can act irrationally but what are the REASONS behind terrorism and what is anyone doing about that?

 

[Bradylama]

The laws against marijuana are prepostorous, to say the least,

Honestly? There's nothing "preposterous" about attempting to keep a mind-altering drug from becoming a detriment to society as much as alcohol has. What is preposterous is the billions of dollars we spend each year to enforce these laws, which only increases the profitability of the sale of marijuana. This is why many politicians are rethinking that legislation.

Then there's Guantanamo Bay

Honestly, I don't see what our treatment of non-citizens has to do with our personal freedoms.

and the US PATRIOT act, which is an abomination.

I wouldn't call it an abomination, but it is a slight infringement on our rights, which is why a lot of Democrats and Republicans are thinking of repealing it.

What's more, the voting system doesn't exactly show great faith in the people either.

You know how I feel about putting control in the people.

For me, either the Netherlands, or Sweden would be "the land of freedom" although there is hardly a real land of freedom.

I believe the man's point was that as a society America is the freest country in the world. Most likely because our sens of nationality is based on ideals rather than being inherent to genetics or regional loyalty. All citizens are "True Americans."

Take France, they didn't do anything bad they only had a different view on things...

This is actually, HIGHLY debatable. Its not so much that France was opposing the war as it was the reasons they were doing so.

Also, saying France hasn't done anything wrong is a serious understatement. Just ask our friends in the smaller EU nations and see how the feel about France.