Real life fallout at hand ?

[welsh]

My gosh! A discussion on Max Weber on No Mutants Allowed. Who would have thought!

I agree with you, but I can't recall Weber ever giving us a definition of a failed or weak state and that's unfortunate. Zartman wrote a good book on collapsed states and there is also the distinction of quasi- and juridical states. In fact I can't find a good definition of a weak state any where (but then try to find a good definition of terrorism- like pornography who know it when you see it).

If you look around the globe, few states really satisfy that definition today. For example there are parts of Brazil that don't look like a strong state, the institutions just don't work and the state is used for profit. Our friends from Indonesia can also relate this to the Suharto regime and the political mess there. But then historically there have not been many Weberian strong states. That's why many of the elements for finding a state drop out and you get left with the notion of monopoly of violence for the defining characteristic. If you got it, you live, if you don't you die.

But on the other elements, I think Tilly has made a good showing that many of the other things we take for granted that states do have, historically been about war-making or the economic essentials to make war- against foes domestic and foreign. The creation of a bureaucracy- to tax, to develop an economy or to regulate internal conflicts (a judiciary and a police force) are kind of about the use of violence within the state for the state's means. The question is not whether the state is a means of repression- rather its about who controls the state.

I would be wary to put much stock in the notion of the relationship between the state and society. There are a lot of weak democracies out there, and many of the strongest states have historically been autocracies. I think Weber's take on legitimacy is often misconstrued. I don't think he was talking about legitimacy between people and state, but the loyalty of the bureaucracy to the state. Remember Weber's talking about a recently unified Germany that has rapidly become a power of Europe, but one that is still going through growing pains.

 

[Briosafreak]

"agree with you, but I can't recall Weber ever giving us a definition of a failed or weak state and that's unfortunate"

My somehow "different" (wich means crappy) aproach to the english language craeted that idea, of course he didn`t talked about those categories, sorry man.

In a nother issue you raised

"on legitimacy is often misconstrued. I don't think he was talking about legitimacy between people and state, but the loyalty of the bureaucracy to the state. Remember Weber's talking about a recently unified Germany that has rapidly become a power of Europe, but one that is still going through growing pains"

Not legitimacy, but how they perceived that they were in fact ruled by a stable power, that could represent and administrate them, even if they don`t like that power very much, or it appeared in an illegitimate way at their eyes, is the way i interpretate those passages. Then again the idea has evolved and many see it as a legitimacy issue these days.

But i`m all ears, this is the first year i`m going to analyse and research more into this type of discussions, so i`m still a long way until i get a more coherent and truethfull view of the subjects. For instance my knowledge on Charles Tilly work is quite mediocre, although i´m using his definition on National states as "relatively centralized, differenciated and autonomous organizations successfuly claiming priority in the use of force within large,contiguous and clearly bounded territories" as a starting point to my inquiries, although it seems that something is missing somewhere...

By the way his definition as nation-states beeing different concepts is, of course right, although "[states] whose peoples share a strong linguistic, religious and simbolyc identity" needs something more too, if that simple definition was definite it would mean that my country is a nation-state since the 12th century...

But i digress, please continue your discussion, don`t mind me

 

[welsh]

Dear Biosafreak-

I actually think a better way of looking at this might come from that old arch-conservative/reactionary Sam Huntington, in Political Order and Changing Societies, where he talks about the importance of governance- it's type so much type but how much, as well as the role of violence in changing societies. Huntington might be a conservative nut (such as the Clash of Civilizations), but he's got more than a few great ideas, especially his old work.

Robert Bates' recent Prosperity and Violence and even Mancur Olsons' 1992 article in American Political Science Review- on the relationship of violence, regime type, and economic development might also be interesting. What is neat about Bates is that he compares trends in Europe with that of Africa. It's also like 150 pages and one of the quickest reads out there.

If you watch Tilly tends to move from a fairly concrete definition to going state with a more- or -less monopoly of violence over more-or-less defined borders, etc. I think Tilly is also having trouble defining states. Honestly I don't think you really have nation states forming until the late 19th Century and the real "strong" states don't really come up until the 20th Century- culminating in the World Wars. A lot of the thinking on this is pretty wishy-washy at best. But Tilly's ideas on war making and the relationship with capital accumulation is great, rise of cities, etc, I think is great. It's interesting that so few people take this idea as far as they could.

Migdal's work on weak and strong states (which seems to live past its utility) I think represents this. What does it mean to be strong or weak? I don't think anyone has a good answer, although we keep talking abotu failed and collapsing states.

An alternative way of thinking is Jackson's Quasi-state definition which gets back to the legal notion that states are state because they have recognized as such by other states. Quasi- (or weak) states are simply recognized by don't have the empirical stuff to make them real states. Henrik Spruyt's book Nation state and its competitors also rests on this notion of recognition.

One thing about this notion of legitimacy, is it more important for a leader to have legitimacy or to keep the opposition so divided that they are not a threat to his rule? In a sense it might be more important for a ruler to sustain the collective action problems of the opposition than actually try to build a notion of loyalty or love. This gives Machiavelli's axiom that its' better to be feared than loved more meaning. I think Weber was on to this as well. If you are trying to centralize power around a central authority, the creation of capable bureaucracy requires that the bureaucrats support the leader, but also that this means more power vis-a-vis local elites. My readings of Weber are getting a bit rusty too, but I think this is what's going on in "Politics as a Vocation."

Bringing this back to Fallout- this seems to be a world dominated by local elites. Local mafias and power holders who utilize violence to create protection rackets and seize individualized gains. Kind of like warlords in many parts of Africa today and even other war lords historically.

 

[Briosafreak]

[font size=1" color="#FF0000]LAST EDITED ON Oct-12-02 AT 00:00AM (GMT)[p]Dear Welsh:


>violence in changing societies. Huntington
>might be a conservative nut
>(such as the Clash of
>Civilizations), but he's got more
>than a few great ideas,
>especially his old work.


The three waves of democracy theory was quite brilliant, as a starting point to understand 88-92 of the last century.
When i first read Clash of the Civilizations i more or less agreed with the critics that said he was toying with a self-realizing prophecy, in the sense that no one could be naive to the point that wouldn`t understand the impact the book would have in some civilizations.

If you take the original Foreign Affairs article out, and can pass the methodical errors all over the book, i believe that one can read it in all new colors, after all this time. I`m reading it again, and the criticisms on the US administration ideas towards Iraq he made in the last few weeks are coherent with his main motivation, or as i aprehend it now, a warning to Social Sciences and Political Science schollars and analysts as also to politicians,that they should start working more on cultural and civilization gaps and bridges, in a non-ideological post-cold war world. Economy and social forces and trends are fine, but we need new beacons in the international arena, or else we may crash sooner than we think.
Morgenthau was a realist that claimed Vietnam was a mistake from the beggining,and not having the old master intelect, Huntington may still prove himself useful...
>
>Robert Bates' recent Prosperity and Violence
>and even Mancur Olsons' 1992
>article in American Political Science
>Review- on the relationship of
>violence, regime type, and economic
>development might also be interesting.

I`m sure it is, but please NO MORE BIBLIOGRAPHY, i`m swamped
>
>
>If you watch Tilly tends to
>move from a fairly concrete
>definition to going state with
>a more- or -less monopoly
>of violence over more-or-less defined
>borders, etc.

I`ll see when i know more of him,then.

I think Tilly
>is also having trouble defining
>states. Honestly I don't think
>you really have nation states
>forming until the late 19th
>Century and the real "strong"
>states don't really come up
>until the 20th Century- culminating
>in the World Wars.

That`s the only point we`ll disagree, i think. The Concert of Nations was pretty much the strong states club, yes, but there are some examples of nation-states dating from the dawn of modernity, if we`re a bit flexible on border changes. Only Denmark and my country have almost the same borders since the 12th century, with ups and downs, like in the Danish-Prussian war, and the tens of conflicts between Castilla and Portugal, but a bit later you`ll find France and the United Kingdom, or Sweden that has some degree of homogenety for some time too, even the sad Poland, particioned more times than my hard drive but with a high level of internal coherence if we choose the basic nation-state concept.
And then again, i`ll try to go a bit more deeper on my research on this issues, so I´ll leave the door open to your idea.

>A lot of the thinking
>on this is pretty wishy-washy
>at best. But Tilly's ideas
>on war making and the
>relationship with capital accumulation is
>great, rise of cities, etc,
>I think is great.
>It's interesting that so few
>people take this idea as
>far as they could.
>
Yep, but not enough by itself, right?


>Migdal's work on weak and strong
>states (which seems to live
>past its utility) I think
>represents this. What does it
>mean to be strong or
>weak? I don't think anyone
>has a good answer, although
>we keep talking abotu failed
>and collapsing states.
>
we have too, they`re the place terrorists create their bases, aid resources go to, and the way they "contaminate" their neighbors with refugees and unrest,generally makes them pretty much important, even if we can`t find a definite answer to strong-and-week discussions.


>An alternative way of thinking is
>Jackson's Quasi-state definition which gets
>back to the legal notion
>that states are state because
>they have recognized as such
>by other states. Quasi- (or
>weak) states are simply recognized
>by don't have the empirical
>stuff to make them real
>states. Henrik Spruyt's book
>Nation state and its competitors
>also rests on this notion
>of recognition.
>
Jackson`s idea is pretty much important, although we need more (btw, what`s his name? seems interesting enough for me to search more on him)


>One thing about this notion of
>legitimacy, is it more important
>for a leader to have
>legitimacy or to keep the
>opposition so divided that they
>are not a threat to
>his rule? In a
>sense it might be more
>important for a ruler to
>sustain the collective action problems
>of the opposition than actually
>try to build a notion
>of loyalty or love.
>This gives Machiavelli's axiom that
>its' better to be feared
>than loved more meaning.
>I think Weber was on
>to this as well. If
>you are trying to centralize
>power around a central authority,
>the creation of capable bureaucracy
>requires that the bureaucrats support
>the leader, but also that
>this means more power vis-a-vis
>local elites. My readings of
>Weber are getting a bit
>rusty too, but I think
>this is what's going on
>in "Politics as a Vocation."
>
I agree,and Machiavelli is fascinating, isn`t it?
But i`ll have to read much more about this, remember that i´m just starting going deep in many of this issues.


>Bringing this back to Fallout- this
>seems to be a world
>dominated by local elites. Local
>mafias and power holders who
>utilize violence to create protection
>rackets and seize individualized gains.
> Kind of like warlords
>in many parts of Africa
>today and even other war
>lords historically.
>
warlords and other organized groups with military or para-military strenght that control parts of a political unity territory is one of the conditions, almost a definite one of a failed-state...wait i said that already , o.k., carry on now...

 

[welsh]

Dear Biosafreak-

I agree with you that Huntington's Foreign Affairs article is better than the book. My guess is that he did the article (which to me seems to much a new formulation of realism) in Foriegn Affairs and the critical commentary was so great, the article so picked up that he decided to do a rather sloppy book (you've got some big methodological errors there). The Third Wave is a better book, agreed. But the literature on democratization is quite vibrant, going back to Barrington Moore. Can't speak about Huntington's recent statements but I do not find it surprising that many of the pundits are being very critical of Bush's Iraq policy.

Personally I am very hesitant on the entire "culture"/
"constructivist" approaches. OK, so the constructivists are a pretty mixed set and I admit to being sympathetic to some of the critical arguments but a lot the big issues still comes down to lawyers, guns and money. Yes, you can find culture but to me it seems culture is yet another structural factor and an element in overcoming collective action problems. Putnum's book on Italy and social capital makes me cringe! People in the South of Italy have poor democracy because they deserve it? - Bullshit. Go to the micro-level relationships and you'll find better answers. The problems I find with culture is the ability to generalize.

The academy is a fashion industry- and culture/constructivism is still the hot thing on the runway, in part because its so easy to criticize the rational choice position.

The bigger problem I have with the international relations theoriest is the desire to make theory from structure to units rather than the other way around, but then IR doesn't even have a good theory for what the state actually is. WHen you look down there you will may find culture, but at the micro-level I am willing to bet there are still the lawyers (the rules), guns (violence) and money (economics) issues at play.

Recent World Bank research by Collier and Hoeffler indicates that the cause of conflicts have more to do with "greed" based incentives than "social grievances". In a way similar to Tilly's "State making as Organized Crime" article, Hoeffler and Collier say that the difference between rebel armies and militias has to do, primarily, with size. You need more people to fight a war than become a mafia. Motivations are driven by greed, financing depends on extracting resources, and social grievances (which I think often include the cultural motivations for conflict) are statistically insignificant. Of course that's the world bank and they should be thinking about economics more.

I agree with you, there is a lot being missed. But I think part of that has to do with the Treaty of Westphalia being almost the beginning of time. I agree that you really do have some interesting polities forming way before the Concert of Europe. Portugal, Sweden, even Switzerland. But I think that our notion of the nation-state should capture two things. First the change from patriomonialism to more institutional rule. The second- the economics of change as well, and this would mean an inclusion of industrialization to post-industrialization, probably the biggest challenge to face nations in the 19th Century and still facing most nations today.

That of course creates all sorts of cultural challenges. I think if the culture argument comes in, I think that's the challenge- modernity vs. tradition power structures.

To some extent you have to forgive Tilly. This is a guy who does 1000 years of history on a book. That he scores more than he misses is quite a statement.

On Jackson- Robert Jackson and the book is Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations, and the Third World. It was published in 1990. But if you want to go back further, He published an article with Rosberg in World Politics in the 1980s, about juridical and empirical states and why Africa's weak states survive, that gets to a lot of the argument. You can get the pdf off Jstor.org.

While I agree that you have to talk about weak states (my research is kind of about how weak states become strong) I think we have to be a bit careful about how we understand the relationship between weak states, refugees and terrorism.

Without a good working definition of terrorism (which capture state sponsored terrorism) we end up speaking past each other. Before using a concept its got to be formed and specified.
Terrorists have received backing from some of the more powerful states. Many of the terrorists that operated in Europe had support from the East Bloc. Also most terrorism is intra-state and happen everywhere- From the Klan, Black Panthers, Weather Underground in the US, to the Basques, to the Red Brigade, Baader Meinhof Gang in Europe. I am willing to bet that most of the terrorists in the Middle East are mostly concerned with their neighborhoods. The relationship between weak states and terrorism is spurious at best, and if it has become globalized, its because globalization makes it easier and the money was there to take advantage of global opportunities. It's not really international terrorism, but transnational terrorism- the ability to permeate borders and engage in the inner dynamics of national states.

As for refugees- every region that has war has suffered refugees, but then regions that suffer natural disaster suffer refugees as well. This is not just people trying to escape droughts in Africa, but dry spells in Brazil, cyclones in South Asia, disease and a host of other nasties. Which lead to migrations to cities, high unemployment and durable poverty- economic problems.

I think what worries me most if we think of the ailments of the current globe of stemming from the weak states, which are usually the colonial leftovers of exploitation, is that this may give us a new wave of colonialism. If one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter, than nation-state building (which may have a humanitarian ideal) may be another man's imperialism.

But I am beginning to think this conversation is too far off the Fallout ideal.

Cheers!

 

[Briosafreak]

>Personally I am very hesitant on
>the entire "culture"/
>"constructivist" approaches. OK, so the constructivists
>are a pretty mixed set
>and I admit to being
>sympathetic to some of the
>critical arguments but a lot
>the big issues still comes
>down to lawyers, guns and
>money. Yes, you can
>find culture but to me
>it seems culture is yet
>another structural factor and an
>element in overcoming collective action
>problems.

Yes, we shouldn`t disregard it to get a better glimpse of the whole picture, but it is just another structural element.

Putnum's book on Italy
>and social capital makes me
>cringe! People in the South
>of Italy have poor democracy
>because they deserve it? -
>Bullshit. Go to the micro-level
>relationships and you'll find better
>answers. The problems I find
>with culture is the ability
>to generalize.
>

Simplification is indeed tempting when we`re talking about cultures.

>The academy is a fashion industry-
>and culture/constructivism is still the
>hot thing on the runway,
>in part because its so
>easy to criticize the rational
>choice position.

Quite agree.


>The bigger problem I have with
>the international relations theoriest is
>the desire to make theory
>from structure to units rather
>than the other way around,
>but then IR doesn't even
>have a good theory for
>what the state actually is.

Yes, but who does in your opinion?

> WHen you look down
>there you will may find
>culture, but at the micro-level
>I am willing to bet
>there are still the lawyers
>(the rules), guns (violence) and
>money (economics) issues at play.
>
But not only that perhaps?

>Recent World Bank research by Collier
>and Hoeffler indicates that the
>cause of conflicts have more
>to do with "greed" based
>incentives than "social grievances".
>In a way similar to
>Tilly's "State making as Organized
>Crime" article, Hoeffler and Collier
>say that the difference between
>rebel armies and militias has
>to do, primarily, with size.
> You need more people
>to fight a war than
>become a mafia. Motivations are
>driven by greed, financing depends
>on extracting resources, and social
>grievances (which I think often
>include the cultural motivations for
>conflict) are statistically insignificant. Of
>course that's the world bank
>and they should be thinking
>about economics more.

Hmmm, too simple to be true, although judging from Colombia they might be on something...


>I agree with you, there is
>a lot being missed.
>But I think part of
>that has to do with
>the Treaty of Westphalia being
>almost the beginning of time.

It is, isn`t it?

> I agree that
>you really do have some
>interesting polities forming way before
>the Concert of Europe.
>Portugal, Sweden, even Switzerland.
>But I think that our
>notion of the nation-state should
>capture two things. First
>the change from patriomonialism to
>more institutional rule.

That indeed needs a bit more, since we had that in the 12th and 13th century, way before everyone else, but it doesn`t seem enough

The
>second- the economics of change
>as well, and this would
>mean an inclusion of industrialization
>to post-industrialization, probably the biggest
>challenge to face nations in
>the 19th Century and still
>facing most nations today.
>
Hmm, i`m not getting what you want to say here, maybe you could give some examples


>That of course creates all sorts
>of cultural challenges. I
>think if the culture argument
>comes in, I think that's
>the challenge- modernity vs. tradition
>power structures.

Wich can bring a few problems, the way development was understood until 62 caused too much waste of resources and the colapse of traditional structures that could have been the backbone to modernisation, in Africa this was pretty dramatic...

>To some extent you have to
>forgive Tilly. This is
>a guy who does 1000
>years of history on a
>book. That he scores
>more than he misses is
>quite a statement.

I need to read more from him, instead of readind so much about him to have an enlightened opinion about him

>On Jackson- Robert Jackson and the
>book is Quasi-states: sovereignty, international
>relations, and the Third World.
>It was published in 1990.
>But if you want to
>go back further, He published
>an article with Rosberg in
>World Politics in the 1980s,
>about juridical and empirical states
>and why Africa's weak states
>survive, that gets to a
>lot of the argument.
>You can get the pdf
>off Jstor.org.

OHHHH, that Jackson
I actually have his phone number somewhere(really...), i had to participate on a discussion about one of his texts once in a Theories of International Relations class,so i dig up quite a bit of stuff about him; he has a manual, very popular with students all over the world, but incredibly poor on ideas...that particular book though is excelent, although i only got parts, thanks for the .pdf info


>While I agree that you have
>to talk about weak states
>(my research is kind of
>about how weak states become
>strong) I think we have
>to be a bit careful
>about how we understand the
>relationship between weak states, refugees
>and terrorism.

It`s ironic that if terrorists use weak-states than we can have a better chance of pushing for humanitarian or even military intervenctions, and political backing to reconstructing and development, in a way that has to produce long time results, instead of the old "schocking tv news images+friendly rock star" help that lasts the time the tv cameras are on, and goes off with them...


>Without a good working definition of
>terrorism (which capture state sponsored
>terrorism) we end up speaking
>past each other. Before
>using a concept its got
>to be formed and specified.

I can`t seem to find the European comission definition, made by a portuguese comissioner, that has been stoped from discussion in the U.N. by some arab countries, but i`ll try to dig it later for you

>Terrorists have received backing from some
>of the more powerful states.
> Many of the terrorists
>that operated in Europe had
>support from the East Bloc.

Agreed, former DDR and Bulgaria for instance


> Also most terrorism is
>intra-state and happen everywhere- From
>the Klan, Black Panthers, Weather
>Underground in the US, to
>the Basques, to the Red
>Brigade, Baader Meinhof Gang in
>Europe.

Very much true, although i have a theory that ETA has passed through the same process that the sicilian militias had passed to tranform to a criminal and greedy organization; i very much respect the free euskadi cause, but they seem to be more of a racket organization these days...


I am willing to
>bet that most of the
>terrorists in the Middle East
>are mostly concerned with their
>neighborhoods. The relationship between weak
>states and terrorism is spurious
>at best, and if it
>has become globalized, its because
>globalization makes it easier and
>the money was there to
>take advantage of global opportunities.
>It's not really international terrorism,
>but transnational terrorism- the ability
>to permeate borders and engage
>in the inner dynamics of
>national states.

Transnational terrorism likes week borders, like those from weak states, although this aren`t on the root of the problem


>
>I think what worries me most
>if we think of the
>ailments of the current globe
>of stemming from the weak
>states, which are usually the
>colonial leftovers of exploitation, is
>that this may give us
>a new wave of colonialism.

The temptation to reinstall the protectorates system is immense, of course, imagine Afghanistan and Iraq first, then who knows...
but to be honest, the leaderships off most off the week states doesn`t help, in the way they administrate, when we talk about getting rid of those prospects...


>If one man's terrorist is
>another's freedom fighter, than nation-state
>building (which may have a
>humanitarian ideal) may be another
>man's imperialism.

Hmmm, yep, but relativism isn`t the answer, or at least it can be more dangerous than good, because of the possibilities of one just choosing to stand still doing nothing, wich is allways the most comfortable choice, but a luxury we can`t have these days...


>But I am beginning to think
>this conversation is too far
>off the Fallout ideal.
>
>Cheers!

Eheh, you`re right, you have one off my mails and my icq on my profile, feel free to contact me to exchange other ideas.

Putting Thomas Moore as a mafia helper was more falloutish, wasn`t it? Maybe we can find a place to Machiavelli as a caravan trader or something in FO3...

 

[welsh]

Thomas Moore as a mafia helper it does have its precedents. David Livingstone (the famous explorer/missionary of Africa) also supplied the Botswana with guns against the Boers.

To answer a few of your points on the quick. I think before IR can make a statement about the states it should have a theory of the state. I think a lot of the comparativists out there are doing good work, and we need to go back to Weber, maybe consider Tilly, Spruyt and the others who problematize the state. Evans too, but his break down of predatory, developmental state structures needs to be explained.

As for mafias and terrorism- the relationship between terror and crime is usually a lot closer than we normally think. After all a terrorist organization has to make money as well. Short of powerful foreign sponsors (which were often East Bloc during the Cold War) or diasporas (like the IRA), that means crime.

But again that's not too unusual either. Back to Tilly, Olson, etc- the relationship between politics and coercion is pretty tight.

But if soviereignty is such a slippery topic, why stop at Westphalia. Hedley Bull said that we might be moving to a period of New Medievalism over 25 years ago. If you look at some of the current work on development, war and globalization, those sentiments are echoed. By imposing the need for the Post Westphalian state we might be missing a lot of the politics that makes the modern world.

This is why I like Fallout so much- you've got violence, politics, crime. You have economics and even culture. You've got little polities going at each other. There is a lot of interesting stuff going on. I would hope for more of that in Fallout 3, but you never know.

Cheers!

 

[Briosafreak]

>This is why I like Fallout
>so much- you've got violence,
>politics, crime. You have economics
>and even culture. You've
>got little polities going at
>each other. There is a
>lot of interesting stuff going
>on. I would hope
>for more of that in
>Fallout 3, but you never
>know.
>
>Cheers!

Yeah, i remember defending that in one of the fallout forae once.
It`s like homework in style
but it requires talent to do, and a few members of the production stuff with enough whakyness and enough cultural baggage to make things in a balanced, fun and inteligent way. Maybe it`s asking too much from BIS these days, maybe not, we`ll see...

Cheers