welsh
Junkmaster
Indeed, Bradylama's point was also at issue in a famous war crime trial, In re Yamashita, in which the Japanese general in charge of the Philippines was tried with for being responsible for the war crimes of his men.
The general's argument was essentially that because US bombardment had destroyed his ability to control or communicate with his men, he couldn't be held accountable if the men acted on their own volition to commit atrocities. If he was not ignorant, than they were beyond his control.
The decision held that it was the responsibility of the general to make sure that his men didn't commit those atrocities. That his ability to control his men was no long possible was irrelevant. He should have made sure that his men didn't commit those crimes in the first place. As a commander he has responsibility for the acts of his men.
Returning to the bill authoritizing the use of force-
Note that the language suggests that by giving the President power to utilized coercive force, the Congress is also making a statement that hopefully that permission might compel Iraq to comply with US demands.
You may recall that at the time that this bill was being discussed there was significant discussion in the US that division within the US Congress might give Iraq the false impression that the administration might not go forward with the war. In a sense by tieing the president's hand in his ability to utilize the force, the Congress might be seen as curtailing the President's power to use coercive diplomacy.
Essentially, for the President to threaten war, the other side has to believe that the President has the power to prosecute that war. If the opposing force believed that Congress would prevent the President, than the opposing force (Iraq here) might be more willing to tempt the fates.
That said, the War Powers Resolution- found here-
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/warpower.htm
The War Powers Resolution was intended to prevent the President from unilaterally undertaking a war without the approval of Congress, and to curtail the President's war-fighting powers. The resolution was part of the Congress's response to the Vietnam War- by which time Congress was very interested in curtailing the power of the President. In the 1980s it came up again when Reagan deployed troops in Lebanon to participate in that country's civil war.
But if you look at the text, primarily Section 4(a) and 5(a) and 5(b) you see where that 60 day deadline comes up. But this is to apply in a situation where the President has not received authorization from Congress to undertake military action. Short of that authorization, Congress still reserves some power, under Section 5(c) as kind of a residual clause but even that is very limited in this case.
But that's not really at play here, and perhaps why the War Powers Resolution has been quiet the last few years. Prior to the War the President did receive the authorization to prosecute the war.
Whether
(a) the Congress gave that authorization based on false pretenses on evidence presented by the Administration; or,
(b) if Congress granted that power to the President in the hopes that by strengthening the President's diplomatic hand so that war might be avoided by making Iraq more certain of the President's power to prosecute the war;
- the president still received the authorization to go forward with the war.
As to Rosh's point, you might recall that the Congress also has the power of the purse which it might use to constrict the power of the president to prosecute the war.
Yet, when Kerry and other Democrats voted against the Presidents' request for billions more to fight the war during the summer prior to the election, that decision came back to hurt Kerry and other Democrats during both the Congressional and Presidential elections.
So it is unlikely that the Congress would vote against the war for to do so would be seen as a betrayal of the troops.
However, that doesn't mean that Congress doesn't have the legal power, but that power is fairly constrained. Even Section 5(c) uses fairly specific language about declaration of law or statutory authorization. But it is politically unlikely whether they would use it.
Is that important? Well mid-term elections will be coming up for Congress so it might be time for people to think about the role of their Congressmen in maintaining the war.
The general's argument was essentially that because US bombardment had destroyed his ability to control or communicate with his men, he couldn't be held accountable if the men acted on their own volition to commit atrocities. If he was not ignorant, than they were beyond his control.
The decision held that it was the responsibility of the general to make sure that his men didn't commit those atrocities. That his ability to control his men was no long possible was irrelevant. He should have made sure that his men didn't commit those crimes in the first place. As a commander he has responsibility for the acts of his men.
Returning to the bill authoritizing the use of force-
Note that the language suggests that by giving the President power to utilized coercive force, the Congress is also making a statement that hopefully that permission might compel Iraq to comply with US demands.
You may recall that at the time that this bill was being discussed there was significant discussion in the US that division within the US Congress might give Iraq the false impression that the administration might not go forward with the war. In a sense by tieing the president's hand in his ability to utilize the force, the Congress might be seen as curtailing the President's power to use coercive diplomacy.
Essentially, for the President to threaten war, the other side has to believe that the President has the power to prosecute that war. If the opposing force believed that Congress would prevent the President, than the opposing force (Iraq here) might be more willing to tempt the fates.
That said, the War Powers Resolution- found here-
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/warpower.htm
The War Powers Resolution was intended to prevent the President from unilaterally undertaking a war without the approval of Congress, and to curtail the President's war-fighting powers. The resolution was part of the Congress's response to the Vietnam War- by which time Congress was very interested in curtailing the power of the President. In the 1980s it came up again when Reagan deployed troops in Lebanon to participate in that country's civil war.
But if you look at the text, primarily Section 4(a) and 5(a) and 5(b) you see where that 60 day deadline comes up. But this is to apply in a situation where the President has not received authorization from Congress to undertake military action. Short of that authorization, Congress still reserves some power, under Section 5(c) as kind of a residual clause but even that is very limited in this case.
But that's not really at play here, and perhaps why the War Powers Resolution has been quiet the last few years. Prior to the War the President did receive the authorization to prosecute the war.
Whether
(a) the Congress gave that authorization based on false pretenses on evidence presented by the Administration; or,
(b) if Congress granted that power to the President in the hopes that by strengthening the President's diplomatic hand so that war might be avoided by making Iraq more certain of the President's power to prosecute the war;
- the president still received the authorization to go forward with the war.
As to Rosh's point, you might recall that the Congress also has the power of the purse which it might use to constrict the power of the president to prosecute the war.
Yet, when Kerry and other Democrats voted against the Presidents' request for billions more to fight the war during the summer prior to the election, that decision came back to hurt Kerry and other Democrats during both the Congressional and Presidential elections.
So it is unlikely that the Congress would vote against the war for to do so would be seen as a betrayal of the troops.
However, that doesn't mean that Congress doesn't have the legal power, but that power is fairly constrained. Even Section 5(c) uses fairly specific language about declaration of law or statutory authorization. But it is politically unlikely whether they would use it.
Is that important? Well mid-term elections will be coming up for Congress so it might be time for people to think about the role of their Congressmen in maintaining the war.
