Geo-Strategic discussion US-Europe-and the rest

[welsh]

BN- that's some wicked teleology you got there-

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleology

Every great power declines.... ok. In the great span of history, yes. Yet states are constructs of societies, and societies rise, fall, rise again.

The mistake is to think that institutions are the causal agent. Institutions are consequences of social forces. They do not think, love, hate, covet, etc. Its people who do that.

You are also getting a bit happy with Tilly- while its true that war created states, war also managed to destory a whole lot of states too. Furthermore, it wasn't the business of going to war that made state, but preparing for war- that created the administrative structures, the accounting methods, the economies- that made war possible.

Japan- for instance- rises up to be a global power, gets crushed in World War 2 for taking on a much stronger power- rises to become one of the dominant economies in the world.

China- its imperial dynasties go through regular periods or rise, decline, then a new dynasty and rise and decline.

Political institutions tend to become stable and stagnant because they are difficult to create and once they are created, those who create them have a vested insterest in sustaining htem.

But political institutions are also the consequences of human will. Furthermore, as the forces of human interaction change, as power fluctuates in a society- the institutions that shape their interactions also change.

Where historically states were created to stabilize the preferences of a dominant class- a protection racket of knights, or a totalitarian economy and state under a idologically driven party, institutions can also change to adapt to circumstances.

Much of continental's movement after Napolean was a conservative backlash to stem the spread of liberialism. Something similar happened after the rise of communism.

Yet the institutions of Europe today are much different than 200 years ago, 150 years ago, 100 years ago, 50 years ago.

Institutions change.

What may undermine Europe is not a teleological end point, but the lack of a meaningful challenge.

That may change in a world of declining resources. As major power struggle over limited fuel, as China challenges Europe's historical dominance over its sphere of influence in Africa- then perhaps Europe will respond. But of the last 20 years Europe has mostly been concerned with Europe- the end of the Cold War and the construction of a united Europe.

As for the US- we've had a cocaine addled ex alcoholic dumbass as president. Its a question to see how far our society declines.

When I hear older white folks say, "Obama is going to enslave the white folks..." I worry.

 

[Brother None]

The mistake is to think that institutions are the causal agent. Institutions are consequences of social forces. They do not think, love, hate, covet, etc. Its people who do that.

The mistake is to think institutions and social forces are separate factors, and endogenous social change is another separate factor. Endogenous change certainly is separate, but institutions and social forces are effect on another in a constant feedback loop.

You are also getting a bit happy with Tilly- while its true that war created states, war also managed to destory a whole lot of states too.

That is an oft-ignored historical truism. But it doesn't actually change the fact that the formation of nation-states and war between European states is central to the development of Europe and thus of the world. Even if you also analyse a number of failed states - as Hagen Schulze does in States, Nations and Nationalism - the same analysis pops out.

War has always been an indirectly progressive force.

Furthermore, it wasn't the business of going to war that made state, but preparing for war- that created the administrative structures, the accounting methods, the economies- that made war possible.

Why do you think I wouldn't know that? The distinction is very irrelevant, too.

Much of continental's movement after Napolean was a conservative backlash to stem the spread of liberialism.

Huh?

No, not really. I mean if you're speaking of the way absolutism developed, sure, but you need to make a distinction between conservatism when it comes to "who has the power" and "what does the power do", the old distinction between procedural rule and the rest (what's the word? I forgot).

You're hooked on procedural, as Americans tend to be, but that's only a bit of the equation in the massive structural leap forward that followed Napoleon. The absolutism, in other words, is very superficial.

 

[welsh]

The mistake is to think institutions and social forces are separate factors, and endogenous social change is another separate factor. Endogenous change certainly is separate, but institutions and social forces are effect on another in a constant feedback loop.

I would agree that institutions can transform individuals expectations and interactions, but at the end of the day, that social change leads to new pressures on institutional structures.

Feedback loops may exist, but they lead to sloppy reasoning. Was it the chicken or the egg- a stupid circular argument. The egg hatched into something different that what laid the egg, and it, in turn, laid an egg that gave life to a new chicken. That these eggs and these chickens may be virtually identifcal does not make them the same- that would be historically inaccurate. Something acted to lay an egg. Causation is a historical phenomena- something comes first.

Likewise- institutions are not autonomous ideas that were given birth spotanteously, but were forms of social interaction that evolved over time. But it is people that shape, manage, create and destroy institutions. People came first.

That is an oft-ignored historical truism. But it doesn't actually change the fact that the formation of nation-states and war between European states is central to the development of Europe and thus of the world. Even if you also analyse a number of failed states - as Hagen Schulze does in States, Nations and Nationalism - the same analysis pops out.

Yet the argument that war makes states is, itself, insufficient. Afterall, war didn't just create states in Europe but other forms of political organization. Wars also happened in other parts of the world and didn't form states. And in Europe, war more often destroyed states than created them. That hundreds of polities died to create the handful of states of today's modern Europe can not be reduced to a mono-causal argument based on war alone. Not even Tilly does that.

Why do you think I wouldn't know that? The distinction is very irrelevant, too.

Not really. Modern Japan emerges- like Europe, out of the shadow of a US security umbrella. But Japan's momentum for development was driven by an international uncertain environment. Yet even Japan has maintained a relatively passivist foreign policy, yet it has managed to create one of the world's great economies.

Huh?

No, not really. I mean if you're speaking of the way absolutism developed, sure, but you need to make a distinction between conservatism when it comes to "who has the power" and "what does the power do", the old distinction between procedural rule and the rest (what's the word? I forgot).

Metternich? You mean he was keen on giving power to the people? And the others who lashed at Napolean's revolution and tried to maintain Europe's history of class divisions?

You're hooked on procedural, as Americans tend to be, but that's only a bit of the equation in the massive structural leap forward that followed Napoleon. The absolutism, in other words, is very superficial.

Procedural? What- you mean government by law? Absolutism is superficial?

You're not making lots of sense.

 

[Sander]

Procedural? What- you mean government by law? Absolutism is superficial?

You're not making lots of sense.

For as far as I can tell, Brother None is arguing that the changes occurring after Napoleon were very liberal - even through the actions of absolutist rulers.

In other words, the fact that a government is absolutist doesn't mean that its actions are inherently conservative. To think of democracy as a requirement for liberal progression (and hence seeing post-Napoleon Europe as more of a conservative group) is typically American.

 

[Blakut]

Yeah, like nazis lead the first public and government backed anti-smoking campaing.

 

[welsh]

Metternich was a liberal? Really?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Age_of_Metternich

The Age of Metternich refers to the period of European politics in between the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815 and the Revolutions of 1848. After the Congress of Vienna, the European powers collectively agreed to maintain the balance of power. This partially consisted of helping to suppress any internal strife that occurred in any European Empire. This period was marked by the tragic "success" in putting down popular, mainly democratic, uprisings.

The "Age of Metternich" gets its name from the Austrian statesman, Prince Klemens Metternich, who dominated Austrian and German politics during the era and best exemplified the reactionary attitude of the age.

The Age of Metternich came to a dramatic close when the desire for self-determination finally boiled over in the Revolutions of 1848, when rebellions occurred in almost every major European city. Besides France (where the uprisings succeeded in overthrowing the government), the European powers were generally successful in suppressing the uprising. However the governments also had to make important concessions (which included the dismissal of Metternich himself) which would lead to the rise of nationalism and the Unification of Germany and Italy, as well as the slow decline of the old Habsburg-dominated Austrian Empire.