Economics focus
Unlikely revolutionaries
Sep 22nd 2005
From The Economist print edition
The World Bank cannot go where its research is leading it
THE cover carries a fresco by Diego Rivera, a Mexican revolutionary and artist. The text within bemoans the many ways, overt and covert, in which elites protect their interests and hold down the poor. In response, it advocates policies that will challenge the privileged and empower the disenfranchised. The World Bank's latest World Development Report (WDR), published this week, is heady stuff: more than 200 pages arguing that the Bank itself, as well as the governments it helps, should put “equity” at the forefront of their thinking.
The WDR is not quite as radical as this sounds. By “equity”, it means equality of opportunity, not equality of outcome (except that people who squander their opportunities entirely should be spared the worst of outcomes). A person's fate should be decided by effort, talent and luck, not race, caste, gender or inherited privilege. Philosophers will wonder why the talented, who did not earn their God-given abilities, deserve their rewards any more than the well-born, who did not choose their parents. Such cavils aside, there is little here to which a liberal could object.
Some people prize equity for its own sake. But the WDR sees equity primarily as a means to the end of economic development. Redistribution of “access to services, assets or political influence” can be a way to make the economy as a whole more efficient. It is not an ideological imperative so much as a technical fix: a second-best response to market failure.
This claim is best illustrated in the report's chapter on inequality and investment. It shows that failures in the markets for credit, insurance, land and human capital result in underinvestment by the poor, overinvestment by the rich and a less efficient economy. To understand this, it is necessary to appreciate how markets should work in an ideal world—because if they worked as economists would like, they would deliver much of the equity the WDR would advocate.
In a perfect credit market, the WDR points out, there should be no connection between wealth and investment. A free market in capital breaks the link between the amount people own and the amount they can invest. In such a market, anyone can borrow or lend as much as they want at the going rate of interest.
In reality, the rich and poor borrow on very different terms. Much of the research cited in the WDR is several years old, but this is an area in which economic power shifts slowly. According to a 1989 study of six villages in the south of India, the rich were typically asked to pay interest rates of 33%, while the poor borrowed at rates of over 100%, when they could borrow at all. This is partly because lenders ask for collateral that only the well-off can provide.
In addition, banks and other lenders maintain a spread between the rate they pay on deposits and the rate they charge on loans. This is, of course, how they make their money. But in poor countries, this spread widens to alarming proportions. The same 1989 report found that India's informal “finance corporations”—which act much like banks, although they cannot issue cheques or transfer funds—paid 12% at most on deposits of less than a year, while charging at least 48% on loans.
This gulf between loan rates and deposit rates contributes to the misallocation of capital, the WDR points out. Whereas poorer entrepreneurs invest someone else's money, richer entrepreneurs often invest their own. For the poor, an investment is worthwhile only if its returns exceed the cost of capital, ie, the rate they must pay on money borrowed from the bank. For richer entrepreneurs who can finance themselves, on the other hand, an investment is worth doing if it exceeds the opportunity cost of capital, ie, the rate they can earn by putting their money in the bank. In a perfect credit market, the spread between these two rates, the deposit and the loan rate, would be wafer thin. But in poor countries, it is often unbelievably fat.
As a result, some firms are starved of capital, while others have more than they can usefully digest. Small Mexican firms with less than $200 invested in them had rates of return as high as 15% a month, according to one study. By contrast, rates of return for larger firms, with more than $900 invested, were often negative. Ghanaian pineapples provide another striking example. Turning to pineapple production from maize and cassava promised average returns of more than 1,200%, according to a 1999 study by Markus Goldstein and Christopher Udry of Yale University. But only 190 of the 1,070 plots studied were devoted to the juicier crop. Farmers said they could not afford to switch.
Willing the end, but not the means
The Bank's solutions to these particular inefficiencies are by now familiar: extending microfinance, for example, or giving the poor formal title to their land and property so they can offer it as collateral. But it also argues that the best policies for fighting poverty might involve “redistributions of influence, advantage or subsidies away from dominant groups”. It hastens to add that expropriating the rich might not be good for investment. But even when they are desirable, such usurpations are not necessarily feasible. A dominant group is, by definition, one that tends to guard its influence, advantage and subsidies jealously and, on the whole, successfully.
In the end, the WDR would probably disappoint the revolutionary who provided its cover image. The Bank is in no position to overturn dominant elites. These are, after all, the people with whom the bank must deal. The WDR is a report, not a manifesto, and contains the usual bureaucratic disclaimer. “It is neither the mandate nor the comparative advantage of the World Bank to engage in advice on issues of political design,” it says. The Bank cannot do much about many of the deep-seated injustices and inequities it analyses in its report. But with its charts, tables and numbers, it paints an arresting mural nonetheless.