welsh
Junkmaster
Honestly, I think this conversation is a bit silly-apologies to all parties, though I agree with Kharn and Rosh in saying that John is being a bit too heavy handed in saying the US is "the best of all armies."
The thinking here seems to be based on notions of World War 2. The more appropriate questions are -
(1) Would a war between the US and China (regardless of Russia's involvement - and I doubt Russia would side with China) lead to nuclear war?
Probably. The distinction between tactical and strategic weapons would probably make little difference. If a city can be vaporized with either a strategic or tactical nuclear warhead than it's a strategic weapon. Since US conventional weapon systems (aircraft carriers, submarines, surface warships, bombers, cruise missiles) and probably Chinese too can carry both conventional explosives or nuclear warheads, one has to be risk averse. If a missile or a bomber is coming at you, it's probably carrying a nuclear weapon that means to either deny you your nuclear weapons or turn your cities to dust.
The theory that one can manipulate how your adversary climbs up the escalation ladder of nuclear war is silly. If a Chinese attack sub takes out by SLBM sub, I am going to assume the Chinese are aiming for strategic assets. At that point it becomes "use it or lose it."
(2) how many nuclear strikes can either side deliver to the other to fundamentally alter their individual quality of life for survivors.
Can the Chinese threaten enough US cities? Can the US threaten enough Chinese cities? I would wager that the Chinese are a lot more risk accepting than the US when it comes to losing cities, but not that much. China is densely populated, relies on a very narrow area for agricultural production and on exports to buy rice abroad. Take that away and you have a famine of Biblical scales.
Should both countries have enough nuclear weapons to make the costs of war higher than potential gains- than you have deterrence.
That said, if either side would have the ability to deny the other the ability to launch a nuclear strike or to minimize the costs of nuclear war vis-a-vis the possible gains, than war would become increasingly likey (for example with a missile shield). This was part of the Reagan strategy - destablize the Soviets into thinking a new arms race was coming up and one in which they could not hope to win. Since the costs of war outweight the price of peace (political change) the gamble was that the Soviets would reform. Note that n the process of building such a weapon system, the non-owner has an incentive to strike first (the "use it or lose it" problem).
That said, peace is sustained by balancing terror against each other so that war, even at a limited, conventional level (what Clausewitz might call limited war) would run the risk of all out strategic conflict (Or Clausewitz's total war- a war of annihiliation) in which both societies would be so destroyed that they would essentially be relegated to the Third World.
But deterrence is basically abour character- one has to believe that when you start a war, it's total and there is little wiggle room.
So recalculate- Deterrence succeeds when the parties believe that A (= the costs of war outweights the gains of war) X (=probability that the war will go nuclear) < Costs of peace.
Note that if the costs of war are very high, even a low probability of either country actually doing it means that war will probably be avoided.
What might make countries risk such a war? The possibility that one might inevitably and irrevocably lose as a power in the heirarchy of nations to the point where soveriegn power to safeguard one's most precious values are forfeit. To lose one's access to energy might be such a risk. In that sense a Fallout scenario of war over control of oil, might be more possible.
Has this happened? Japan in World War 2 began a war with the US on the unlikely chance that the US would fight a limited war or quit. Instead the US committed to the war and unconditional surrender, the more likely outcome of Pearl Harbor and Japan's doom. Why? Because US retaliation against Japan's intervention into indochina to bring an end to its war in China led to retaliations that would inevitably have meant Japan lost it's position as a potential dominant force in Asia. That said, I don't think the Japanese really foresaw Hiroshima, Nagasaki or the firebombings of most of their cities. War is a high risk game that ruling elites seem to enjoy playing.
The thinking here seems to be based on notions of World War 2. The more appropriate questions are -
(1) Would a war between the US and China (regardless of Russia's involvement - and I doubt Russia would side with China) lead to nuclear war?
Probably. The distinction between tactical and strategic weapons would probably make little difference. If a city can be vaporized with either a strategic or tactical nuclear warhead than it's a strategic weapon. Since US conventional weapon systems (aircraft carriers, submarines, surface warships, bombers, cruise missiles) and probably Chinese too can carry both conventional explosives or nuclear warheads, one has to be risk averse. If a missile or a bomber is coming at you, it's probably carrying a nuclear weapon that means to either deny you your nuclear weapons or turn your cities to dust.
The theory that one can manipulate how your adversary climbs up the escalation ladder of nuclear war is silly. If a Chinese attack sub takes out by SLBM sub, I am going to assume the Chinese are aiming for strategic assets. At that point it becomes "use it or lose it."
(2) how many nuclear strikes can either side deliver to the other to fundamentally alter their individual quality of life for survivors.
Can the Chinese threaten enough US cities? Can the US threaten enough Chinese cities? I would wager that the Chinese are a lot more risk accepting than the US when it comes to losing cities, but not that much. China is densely populated, relies on a very narrow area for agricultural production and on exports to buy rice abroad. Take that away and you have a famine of Biblical scales.
Should both countries have enough nuclear weapons to make the costs of war higher than potential gains- than you have deterrence.
That said, if either side would have the ability to deny the other the ability to launch a nuclear strike or to minimize the costs of nuclear war vis-a-vis the possible gains, than war would become increasingly likey (for example with a missile shield). This was part of the Reagan strategy - destablize the Soviets into thinking a new arms race was coming up and one in which they could not hope to win. Since the costs of war outweight the price of peace (political change) the gamble was that the Soviets would reform. Note that n the process of building such a weapon system, the non-owner has an incentive to strike first (the "use it or lose it" problem).
That said, peace is sustained by balancing terror against each other so that war, even at a limited, conventional level (what Clausewitz might call limited war) would run the risk of all out strategic conflict (Or Clausewitz's total war- a war of annihiliation) in which both societies would be so destroyed that they would essentially be relegated to the Third World.
But deterrence is basically abour character- one has to believe that when you start a war, it's total and there is little wiggle room.
So recalculate- Deterrence succeeds when the parties believe that A (= the costs of war outweights the gains of war) X (=probability that the war will go nuclear) < Costs of peace.
Note that if the costs of war are very high, even a low probability of either country actually doing it means that war will probably be avoided.
What might make countries risk such a war? The possibility that one might inevitably and irrevocably lose as a power in the heirarchy of nations to the point where soveriegn power to safeguard one's most precious values are forfeit. To lose one's access to energy might be such a risk. In that sense a Fallout scenario of war over control of oil, might be more possible.
Has this happened? Japan in World War 2 began a war with the US on the unlikely chance that the US would fight a limited war or quit. Instead the US committed to the war and unconditional surrender, the more likely outcome of Pearl Harbor and Japan's doom. Why? Because US retaliation against Japan's intervention into indochina to bring an end to its war in China led to retaliations that would inevitably have meant Japan lost it's position as a potential dominant force in Asia. That said, I don't think the Japanese really foresaw Hiroshima, Nagasaki or the firebombings of most of their cities. War is a high risk game that ruling elites seem to enjoy playing.
