Ilosar said:
Yeah, but the Talibans aren't an army or a regime, they're scattered bands of determined militias with the almost full support of the local population. I don't think the average downtrodden and starving North Korean populace will be as willing to help Regime troops, no matter what Pyongyang boasts about their supposed fanatism.
All the misdirection in the world doesn't matter much when you barely have cold war equipment against modern toys, your soldiers are half-starved, and your vehicles can barely run because you got next to no gas now that the hands-out have stopped. Simple logistics dictate that as it exists, the KPA is simply not capable of anything close to a prolonged war, especially because China and Russia will almost certainly desert them as soon as the bullets start flying. We're not in 1951 anymore.
I'm looking up KPA data and it seems that the "impoverished, starved army" is a myth created by western media, not supported by hard data. In fact, there's little actual evidence either way. The KPA being a paper tiger is an assumption by SK and US analysts.
http://www.examiner.com/article/north-vs-south-korea-the-balance-of-military-power
There are two major problems I see:
1. Modern equipment is inherently better than old equipment.
I consider the above statement fallacious. It's an argument from novelty that doesn't consider actual performance. An antiquated AKM is still a viable assault rifle that is going to be a problem for anyone on the receiving end, just like a modern export AK. A 155mm shell fired from an antiquated howitzer is going to be a bad day for anyone, especially if its accompanied by dozens more covering one of its approaches.
Any modern technology can be countered. If disorganized, untrained militas can do that in Afghanistan, consider how much more effective a trained, state-backed army would be in a similar scenario.
2. The KPA is weak because it doesn't have fuel or food to support its operations.
It's an assumption, backed by weak sources. It also doesn't account for non-conventional warfare or sleeper agents in SK (who, by definition, are in deep cover and can't really be assessed). One of the elements of Soviet military doctrine were operations on US soil in case of conflict: Spetsnaz units penetrating the mainland as deep undercover agents and staging attacks on military assets (Suvorov's book on Spetsnaz is an enlightening lecture).
But as I said, all that is moot anyhow. The North Koreans will never start a war no matter how pissant they try to appear, and the US knows it's not in his interests to bomb the crap outta them. Pyongyang will shout, get its oil and food, then stay silent for a few years until it dries up. Then the music will start again. And meanwhile, it's their people that suffers.
Wars have a tendency to break out unexpectedly, sometimes as a result of an incident going out of proportion.