To be honest-
(1) I think the Russian caught everyone by surprise. Nothing like a little war during the Olympics.
(2) Not knowing much about Russia and Georgia, I can't speak to particulars of this little tit for tat, but knowing civil wars, I would be surprised if this thing didn't take time to heat up.
(3) I seriously doubt the Georgians ever thought the Americans would step in. That would be foolish. I mean, dude... you're in their sphere of influence.
(4) While knowing little about Russia and Georgia, I do know a bit about international law.
Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter- thou shalt not invade another country unless given permission to do so under the UN Charter and by Security Council Resolution.
Invading a neighbor even to defend nationals isn't quite kosher. Are these folks ethnically Russian or Russian nationals?
Granted these legalities can be dicey, but even the US was careful that it invaded Afghanistan (right to self -defense), Iraq (under Security Council Resolution) and I think Kosovo also had some prior authorization.
(5) Perhaps we should just cut the crap and call this a little Russian imperialism over its near-abroad? Hey, the US invaded lots of countries in Latin America on more shaky grounds. That was imperialism too- even if Americans don't like that term. Would Russia intervene if we invaded, say, Dominican Republic? Doubtful. What about.... Panama? Haiti? Grenada....
(6) Maybe Putin & Co just got tired seeing the US in its own little war and wanted one of their own. Nothing like a short, quick, successful war to build up popularity on the home front. Note all the Russophiles getting happy on this board.
(7) Funny, Russians bombing civilians gives Russians boners as big as US planes bombing Iraqis gives Republicans a hard on. And yes, its equally stupid. This didn't have to be so broad a war or probably require war at all. But war is frequently easier to do when you have overwhelming superiority. Hey, Iraq was easy... at least for the first few months.
(8) Yep, that genocide definition is way to broad to be useful.
(9) Generally speaking the Olympics and Edward's affairs is bigger news in the US than Russia and its neighbors. Would the US go to war with Russia over this? What are you kidding?
(10) Oil- personally, I wonder if this isn't partially a move to increase oil prices and profits on the internation market.
(11) Missile shield- Didn't Putin say that continued movement towards building a missile shield would lead to a US military response? This seems like a good excuse for a demonstration of Russian concern.
Russia and Georgia
Calling a halt
Aug 12th 2008
From Economist.com
Russia says its military operations in Georgia are over
“THE aggressor has been punished; its armed forces have suffered significant losses and are disorganised." With these words, on Tuesday August 12th, Russia’s president, Dmitry Medvedev, announced the end of military operations in Georgia. The decision coincided with the arrival in Moscow of the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who welcomed the decision as “good news”. It came a day after President George Bush said Russia’s push into a sovereign neighbouring state was “unacceptable in the 21st century”. European foreign ministers are due to hold an emergency meeting on Wednesday.
Bush gave an interview with Bob Costas during the Olympics where he said, "America doesn't have problems." Well, the biggest problem might be a clueless leadership. This might be seen as more of the same problem.
It is unclear how much impact such diplomatic pressure has had on the Russian leadership—or leaderships, given the uncertain distribution of power between Mr Medvedev and his predecessor, Vladimir Putin, now prime minister.
Nothing like a little political uncertainty to create a credit risk and make your neighbors nervous.
Oh... come on. Like we didn't know Putin was in charge?
Western countries have offered the beleaguered Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, little more than words of support. It remains to be seen how Mr Medvedev’s comments translate on the ground. Each side says the other has continued at least some fighting. Russian-backed forces in Abkhazia, one of the two separatist regions of Georgia, were making a push to clear Georgian troops out of the Kodori gorge—the only area of that breakaway province under Georgian control.
I wonder if this turns out to be a land grab. Hey, remember Kosovo?
On the main front—around the second breakaway region, South Ossetia—Russian and Georgian ground forces largely disengaged on Monday when Georgian troops fled the city of Gori before an expected Russian advance, apparently to regroup around the capital, Tbilisi. In the event, the Russians did not advance on Tbilisi but contented themselves with severing Georgia’s main east-west highway.
Give the Georgian troops a break. Imagine a Sledge hammer vs a mouse. You'd look for somewhere to hide too.
If Mr Medvedev’s words are taken at face value, it seems the Kremlin has calculated that the benefit of inflicting further damage on Georgian forces, perhaps even physically evicting the detested Mr Saakashvili from power, was outweighed by the growing cost to Russia’s diplomatic position, and the burden of taking and occupying unambiguously sovereign Georgian territory.
Or maybe a reluctance go get stuck in a hostile (Iraq like) occupation?
The military cost to Russia is still unclear. The Russian high command admitted to losing four planes, while Georgia claims to have shot down 20 aircraft; Mr Saakashvili claimed some Russian unexploded bombs had been daubed with messages such as “This one is for NATO”. Although routed in South Ossetia, Georgian forces might yet have put up a sterner fight to defend Tbilisi. The war, moreover, alarmed investors in Russia, weakening the rouble and Russian stocks.
War = Credit risk.
All told, the Kremlin may be content to take its gains—the humiliation of Mr Saakashvili, the exposure of the limits of western support for Georgia and the demonstration of Russia’s military power—without incurring further risk. Better, perhaps, to let Mr Saakashvili take the blame for rashly starting a failed war by trying to retake South Ossetia, than to portray him as a martyr for democracy and force western countries to do more to support him.
Translated- a military bitch slap.
Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, claimed his country was not seeking to overthrow Mr Saakashvili, but said “it would be better if he went". Russia says it wants the International Criminal Court in The Hague to investigate what it says are war crimes, even genocide, committed by Georgian troops in South Ossetia. Mr Saakashvili said Russian forces were carrying out "ethnic cleansing" of Georgians in areas under their control.
This is how the law of war gets to become victor's justice.
For the moment, though, Georgians seem to be rallying around Mr Saakashvili. A large crowd, estimated at around 150,000, cheered him at a rally in Tbilisi where an unrepentant Mr Saakashvili denounced Russia's aggression. He said Georgia did not start the war but had "no choice" but to respond to Russian military actions, and that nothing had been lost. "We will never allow that Georgia will be broken up into pieces." But his position may yet suffer if the immediate Russian military threat recedes and Georgia negotiates the terms of a permanent ceasefire.
Little pieces of Georgia to become little pieces of Russia?
Russia has said it cannot accept the deployment of Georgian peacekeeping troops alongside Russian ones in South Ossetia, as suggested by France, after the past five days of fighting. Mr Medvedev, for his part, set two conditions for a full settlement of the conflict: Georgian troops had to return to their initial positions and be partly demilitarised; and Georgia had to sign a binding agreement ruling out the use of force to retake South Ossetia.
Georgian officials say NATO's refusal earlier this year to give Georgia (and Ukraine) a firm framework to join the alliance, known as the “membership action programme” (MAP)—it got only a vague promise of eventual membership and a commitment to re-examine the issue in December—had given Russia a "green light" to attack the country. NATO's secretary-general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said the promise remained valid. But in reality, any hope that Georgia had of securing MAP at a meeting of NATO ministers in December has all but evaporated.
Probably. As BN has argued. Article 5 means an attack on one means an attack on all.
This leads to two potential consequences-
(1) the ladder of escalation. In this theory, each side slowly ratchets up the military intensity leading from a small conflict, to a conventional war to a strategic war. Ideally, the sides can control this. Realistically?
or
(2) Massive escalation- under this theory, as soon as strategic weapons (like nuclear submarines or nuclear weapon carrying aircraft carriers) become targets, than the war becomes strategic. This is the use it or lose it problem. Missiles in silos and bombers on bases are vulnerable to the enemy first strike, so you are given incentives to strike first and strike heavy. Both sides know this... so strategic nuclear exchange becomes a certainty.
Neither theory has really been tested in a hot war. Happily.
NATO has to consider Georgia's action. What if a member nation escalates a conflict with Russia towards war. NATO would have to defend if a member is attacked. So why allow a member to join if that member is going to start a fight?
David Miliband, Britain's foreign secretary, said on Tuesday that Russia could not expect “business as usual” in its relations with the West and that diplomatic pressure would be brought to bear where possible to curb Russian aggression. But the West has made clear it will not fight Russia for the sake of Georgia.
And wisely so. After all, Georgia remains in Russia's immediate sphere.
That said, there are a couple of consequences for NATO in all of this.
(1) It should be careful about who it admits in the club.
(2) It needs to stand by Article 5 or it means nothing.
(3) Its unwillingness to protect Georgia can be seen as a sign of weakness.
(4) But- there is nothing like lines of Russian tanks blitzkrieging a country to remind Europe of one of the reasons NATO exists.
Edit-
a few days earlier- The Economist published this-
Georgia
Russia and Georgia rattle sabres
Apr 30th 2008
From Economist.com
Tension grows over Abkhazia
GEORGIA and Russia agree upon one thing: the situation in the breakaway province of Abkhazia is bad and getting worse. Georgia, an ex-Soviet republic with close links to America, says that Russia is illegally putting more troops in the region. Last week it produced video footage of what looks like a Russian warplane shooting down an unmanned Georgian surveillance drone. Russia retorts that its troops are deployed legally as peacekeepers. And the Kremlin says that it is the Georgian authorities who have been acting provocatively, by increasing their military presence in the Kodori Gorge, a small bit of Abkhazia still controlled by the central government in Tbilisi.
Hmmm.. looks like both sides are saying the other was deploying troops where they weren't supposed to go.
The most pessimistic interpretation is that the Kremlin, having decided that the West is too divided and distracted to care about Georgia, is increasing the pressure in order to destabilise its small neighbour and perhaps replace the current rulers with a more pro-Russian lot. If so, one should fear serious bloodshed. The latest shenanigans started shortly after a NATO summit in Bucharest, in early April, where Germany and others blocked an American attempt to give Georgia, as well as Ukraine, a clear path towards membership of the Western military alliance. Georgia is threatening to block Russia's accession to the World Trade Organisation.
Maybe that's the cause? Blocking access to the WTO? Or a little political manipulation in a neighboring state.
The outside world so far has taken neither the Georgian nor the Russian version of events at face value. Georgia has something of a reputation for crying wolf about Russian intentions. The Kremlin has in the past made groundless claims about Georgian misbehaviour. Either side could be increasing tension for its own domestic political reasons.
The Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, is facing a strident opposition that regards him as a corrupt and eccentric autocrat. A strong statesmanlike stance against Russia may help him to keep them at bay in the parliamentary elections on May 21st. And a confrontation with Russia may help to distract his foreign critics, who care a lot about democracy but even more about defending Georgia from Russian mischief-making.
If so, than maybe Mik got a break. An invading Russian army withdraws with him still in power means Russia loses, Mik wins.
More conspiratorially, it could be that hardliners in Moscow would welcome confrontation with Georgia to set the tone for the new presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, a man they regard as a poor substitute for the hawkish Vladimir Putin. Mr Medvedev takes office next week.
Hey, because nothing like tanks in the fields to give a guy a woody.
Yet even if either side (or both) is overstating the case, the Caucasus is too flammable a place to be ignored. Georgia is an important link in the energy corridor that connects the oil-rich Caspian region with the outside world. Europe would like that to become a route for gas exports too.
NATO said on Wednesday April 30th that it is watching Russia's troop build-up “with concern”. Both the alliance and the European Union have blamed the Kremlin for raising tensions. NATO ambassadors met David Bakradze, a senior Georgian politician, in Brussels on Monday. But to Georgia’s backers at least, Western support looks pretty limp. The only practical move that NATO could agree upon was to send representatives to visit Georgia—by the end of the year. As a foreign minister from another ex-communist country notes, “Georgia is not formally an ally” of the West. The minister is privately sympathetic to the Georgians’ plight, but is pessimistic about their prospects.
So maybe NATO wasn't quite so surprised.
It is hard to see an easy way out. Georgia recently offered Abkhazia a deal that included full autonomy, a veto on legislation and constitutional changes and a guaranteed position as vice-president. But that has probably come too late.
Doesn't quite sound so genocidal...
The big question is how far Russia will push. It has stopped short of formal diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia and another smaller breakaway statelet called South Ossetia (see map). But on April 16th a presidential decree established formal legal ties with both places. That may have been merely a symbolic reaction to the West’s recognition of Kosovo, which Russia saw as a gross breach of the territorial integrity of its ally, Serbia. Or it may prove a prelude to the de facto annexation of both territories, as Georgia claims. If Russia overplays its hand, it could find that the outside world sharply questions the legitimacy of its peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia. Critics have long referred to them as “piece-keepers”. That may prove to have been a prescient bit of mockery.
Peacekeepers are supposed to be neutral.
Edit again-
More background this time. But based on this, I think the smart move for the Russians would be to contain this nonsense and not get caught in it.
Tales from the Black Sea
Jul 3rd 2008 | SUKHUMI AND TBILISI
From The Economist print edition
The Abkhaz and the Georgians have reason to resent each other—but both need to rebuild trust if they are to have a prosperous future
AT MIDDAY Ochamchira, in Abkhazia, is almost empty. A derelict cement tower and rusty fairground wheel are the backdrop to an empty stretch of Black Sea coast that was once the Soviet riviera. The ageing owner of a bar is reading a book of Soviet recipes, but his only customer is a woman who downs her vinegary red wine and leaves. “This time 15 years ago people were queuing outside,” he says. Then there were 25,000 residents; today 3,000 are left.
The ethnic conflict between Georgia and its breakaway enclave, Abkhazia, was one of many detonated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Recently, this patch of land, in law part of Georgia but in effect controlled by Russia, has become a new frontier between Russia and the West. Two months ago Georgia and Russia came close to war. Russia accused Georgia of preparing a strike on Abkhazia, mobilised paratroopers and artillery to join its “peacekeepers”, and shot down a Georgian drone. Hotheads in Tbilisi and Moscow said that war was all but inevitable.
Diplomatic intervention by Europe and America staved it off, but tensions remain high. This week bombs exploded in the Abkhaz town of Gagra and the capital, Sukhumi, prompting Abkhazia to close its border with Georgia; and Russia reopened a sea route between Sochi and Gagra. On July 2nd a bomb ripped through an apartment block in Sochi, host of the 2014 winter Olympics. The Russians make no bones over linking trouble in Abkhazia to Georgia’s hopes of securing NATO membership, which they strongly resist. But even as Georgia and Russia argue, nobody pays much heed to the Abkhaz themselves.
The Abkhaz and the Georgians belong to different ethnic groups but have shared this bit of Black Sea coast for centuries. When the Bolsheviks occupied Georgia, Abkhazia was given the status of a Soviet republic. Only in 1931 did Stalin (a Georgian) turn Abkhazia into an autonomous region of Georgia. Later his secret-police chief, Beria (also a Georgian, born in Abkhazia), resettled Georgians from the western part of the country in Abkhazia, tipping its ethnic balance further in favour of Georgians. Abkhaz schools were shut and the language was banned.
When the Soviet Union fell apart, various ethnic time-bombs planted by Stalin across the Caucasus began to go off. In August 1992 Georgia, itself in near anarchy, began a war in Abkhazia. Nominally under the rule of Eduard Shevardnadze, the country was run by nationalist warlords who recruited criminals to their armies. These troops pillaged Abkhazia, defeating the ill-armed Abkhaz. When the tide of the war turned and the Abkhaz, helped by Chechens and Russian mercenaries, stormed back, they massacred ethnic Georgians. Atrocities were committed on both sides, and some 250,000 of the pre-war Georgian inhabitants (who accounted for 45% of the total population) were forced out through ethnic cleansing. But the Abkhaz look back on the conflict as a war of independence and show little sympathy for Georgian refugees. Their mistrust of Georgia is boosted by Russia’s anti-Georgian propaganda.
Russia, which fanned the conflict first by encouraging the Georgians, then backing the Abkhaz, has throughout played a highly dubious role. It claims to be an impartial peacekeeper, but it has strong vested interests. The Russians have ignored sanctions on Abkhazia meant to force the Abkhaz to take back their refugees, and have also given most Abkhaz Russian passports that let them travel abroad. With 90% of the population enlisted as “Russian citizens”, watching Russian television, using Russian money and receiving Russian pensions, Abkhazia is barely autonomous. And though the Russians often talk about Kosovo as a precedent, they do not really want to see Abkhazia’s independence.
The Abkhaz realise the dangers of assimilation into Russia and are wary of Russian nationalism. When Russia tried to dictate their choice of president, Abkhaz voters picked his rival. Yet even if integration with Russia seems unappealing, to many the idea of being part of Georgia is worse. “At least Russia did not fight against us,” says Stanislav Lakoba, head of Abkhazia’s security council. He adds that Georgia’s hard line and Europe’s indifference have driven Abkhazia into Russia’s arms.
The Abkhaz also know that the only reason for the sudden interest in their plight is Russia’s increasing belligerence. But Sergei Bagapsh, the de facto president, has ruled out replacing or even altering the Russian peacekeeping force. “Our interests will be represented only by Russia,” Mr Bagapsh said after meeting Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s president, recently.
Some of the blame for this situation rests with Georgia’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili. When he swept to power in 2004, he did not use his popularity to apologise for Georgia’s past actions or disown the legacy of his predecessors. By late 2004, Georgia was getting closer to a deal with Russia and a no-use-of-force agreement with Abkhazia, but neither document was signed. Mr Saakashvili said that “we are not inviting separatists to Georgia, we will ourselves return to Abkhazia.” His populism irritated the Abkhaz, as did his decision to banish Irakli Alasania, the only man the Abkhaz side trusted as a negotiator, as ambassador to the UN in New York.
In 2006 the Georgians forced their way into the upper Kodori gorge, violating a 1994 peace agreement. They said they had to clear the area of a local warlord. But Paata Zakareishvili, a Georgian analyst, believes he could have been nabbed in Tbilisi. Ruslan Kishmaria, who oversees Gali, a region where 50,000 Georgian refugees spontaneously returned after the war, says Georgia refuses to let the UN verify their return. Georgian television channels disseminate false reports of Georgians being assaulted from the Abkhaz side. Earlier this year the UN secretary-general said that “inaccurate reports originating in the Georgian media and occasionally the Georgian authorities…have contributed to growing distrust and insecurity.”
In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Mr Saakashvili’s latest peace plan, offering Abkhazia unlimited autonomy, was dismissed as propaganda by the Abkhaz. Mr Saakashvili announced it on Georgian television (which is blocked in Abkhazia). When it was delivered to the Abkhaz, they refused to touch it.
Georgia talks of developing free-trade zones in Abkhazia, but is yet to lift sanctions that do not work anyway. Mr Alasania, whose father was killed in the 1990s war, says that “the key to this conflict lies not in Washington or Moscow but in Tbilisi and Sukhumi…we have to take the first steps towards reconciliation.” Rebuilding trust between the two sides may take years—and even then it may not lead to full reintegration of the country. But if Georgia wants to stay democratic and prosperous, it has no other option. And if they want to preserve their sense of identity, the Abkhaz must do their bit too.
Oh what the hell- a bit more?
Georgia and Russia
Russia has the upper hand
Aug 11th 2008 | NEW YORK AND YEREVAN
From Economist.com
Russia has extended the conflict to a war inside Georgia. The West will have a hard time responding
GEORGIAN troops would withdraw from South Ossetia and would cease firing on the advancing Russians, said Georgia’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili, on Sunday August 10th. But the war rages on. Russia has not only tightened its hold on the breakaway region. It has hit the Georgian city of Gori, in Georgia proper, with airstrikes and is reportedly sending ground forces that way. Russia has also moved on Abkhazia, a separate breakaway region in western Georgia. Russia also says that it has lost four aircraft, shot down over Georgia.
Georgia began shelling South Ossetia—a tiny territory run by Russia’s security forces and a clique of local thugs who live off smuggling goods and pocketing Russian aid money—on August 7th and 8th. At first Russia sent in tanks, but its response escalated quickly to a full-scale invasion. A host of factors give Russia the upper hand. One is, of course, Russia’s military preponderance over its small neighbour. Another is geography: Georgia is not so near other American or NATO interests that the feelings of these latter need to be taken overmuch into account.
To much of the Western world, the Russian-Georgian war is a straightforward case of a powerful, autocratic nation bullying a weak democracy nearby. But many complications make a meaningful response hard. One is that Georgia has not been lily-white itself. The government, led by the pro-western Mr Saakashvili, tarnished its image last year with a crackdown on protesters. And in response to nationalist pressures, he has begun in the past year to try to tighten Georgian control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a separatist region on the Black Sea coast in which Russia has much more strategic interest. It appears that Georgian forces erred badly by shelling South Ossetia last week, but in any case it seemed only a matter of time before Russia responded.
Georgia has called on the outside world to intervene. But it is not clear how effective any response would be. Russia would veto any action at the UN Security Council. Neither NATO nor the European Union have put Georgia on the fast track to membership; if they had, Russia may not have felt so bold. Leading European countries have called for a ceasefire, but have been somewhat even handed in their language. A group of states formerly dominated by Russia—the Baltic republics and Poland—issued a statement more strongly decrying Russian bullying. But some of the bigger EU countries see Georgia’s provocation of Russia as irresponsible. Georgian leaders, in response, ruefully note Europe’s dependence on Russian energy supplies.
The American reaction has been not much clearer. On Sunday America’s vice-president, Dick Cheney, said that Russia’s military action “must not go unanswered”. George Bush, visiting the Olympics, has called for an immediate end to the fighting. So have the two presidential candidates, John McCain and Barack Obama. All put the blame on Russia. But America, besides helping to bring Georgia’s troops home from Iraq quickly, does not have many obvious tools to hand. There is no talk of any military response; America will join mediating efforts with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the EU.
Russia sees it actions as having a parallel in Kosovo. In 1999, NATO fought a war to protect the Albanian-majority province of Yugoslavia from a Serbian crackdown, despite Russian opposition. This year, many western countries recognised Kosovo’s declaration of independence, while somehow suggesting that Kosovo should not set any precedent. Russia claims to see in South Ossetia a friendly and oppressed region seeking independence from a larger country. But the disproportionate Russian response signals far more than concern for hard-pressed South Ossetians (and Russia’s “citizens”, South Ossetians recently given Russian passports). It may be a naked challenge to the West: Russia expects the response to be no more than diplomatic manoeuvres. Russia may also be seeking the removal from power of Mr Saakashvili, sending a signal to other countries on its periphery that, in breaking from Russia and moving westwards, they are playing a dangerous game. That signal is coming through loud and clear.
