welsh said:
Well the US has gone before the ICJ before. But the problem with the ICJ is that parties opt to bring their suits there, they are not compelled. Since there is no mandatory jurisdiction, there is a problem. If say Saddam’s Iraq where to deny jurisdiction, no one cares. If the US does, oh that’s bad.
That’s why the Russians never had to worry about it for Hungary and Czechoslovakia, why Pol Pot didn’t worry about it, why Mao never worried about it, or any of the other ruthless tyrants.
When the Brits brought suit in the Corfu Channels case against Albania, the Brits won, but the Albanians never paid. Thus the problem for the ICJ. Good for settling border disputes, but not much else.
I'm sorry but I fail to see how this makes the ICJ fallacious in its judgement. The fact that countries can deny jurisdiction doesn't mean the ICJ can't judge those countries on its jurisdiction, does it? That's like saying the statutes in the Fourth Geneva Conventions are worthless because Israel didn't sign it.
I see what you mean in how the ICJ is flawed, but that's hardly relevant in their judging of those that do fall under their jurisdiction.
There is a difference between the ICJ and the Conventions. The ICJ lacks mandatory jurisdiction. If parties want to go there, they must choose to, they can’t be forced. That’s the main reason only one or two cases come before the court and these are often border conflicts that each side wants to resolve without conflict. True, some agencies of the UN can also bring suit, but it’s optional. So if the Kuwait were to sue Saddam, Saddam could merely say, I refuse to accept jurisdiction in this matter, and the case dies. There was an argument that if you signed the UN Charter you were automatically under the ICJ’s jurisdiction, but that has never been accepted.
Now the Geneva Conventions are a bit different. Based on the notion of treaty law, if you sign a treaty you are bound by it. You can, later, decide out of a treaty, but once you are in others have a right to think that you are bound. So if you sign the Geneva Conventions you are bound to comply. But there are problems there as well. Some countries sign international law more as a statement of principles. So the Universal of Declaration becomes part of their constitution, but these are countries that neither have the ability nor probably the will to enforce those rules. In the US that wouldn’t work. If the US signed the Universal Declaration, that people could sue to enforce that- and since the standards are unclear- (for example- everyone has a right to a home- but what kind of home? A mansion or a cardboard hut?) the US couldn’t sign.
So, to your example. If Israel signed the Geneva Conventions it’s bound but law. Even if it acts as if it believes that it is bound by the Geneva Convention such that it is customary to comply with it, even if Israel didn’t sign it, than it’s bound under a doctrine of Customary International Law. However, if the Palestinians say- we’re suing you in the ICJ for what you did to us. The Israeli’s could tell them to fuck off.
There are consequences to that, of course, but they have more to do with international reputation. This is one of the problems with the US not signing on to the Criminal Court.
welsh said:
An international criminal court might be different, but as mentioned before, there is plenty of reason to believe that it would be used as a political platform.
Maybe so, maybe not. In a way I doubt it, tho', and I moreso doubt if it would effect the neutrality of the court.
That's the same reason why OBL, if captured, should be put on trial at the IJC. No way any American court or muslim court would be neutral.
And that’s the problem- can you get a neutral tribunal? There has been some luck with the WTO courts, and some others, including in the EU- to some extent. But the US would look at it’s experience in the UN with the General Assembly, where there was a lot of heat against the developed states and the US, during much of the 1970s and 80s (and one of the reasons so many Americans hate the UN) because those states were numerous and wanted concessions but at the same time many of those states had their own flaws as well. This was an age of Marxist Developing states that were very cruel to their own people (Ethiopia) dictators who became predatory and Soviet proxies.
Honestly, I think the US would have a hard time if someone in East Timor brought a suit against Henry Kissinger for giving the Indonesians the green light for occupying the country. It is the consequences of a rather faustian bargain- to fight the communists (which the US saw as the greater evil) we made pacts with smaller devils.
welsh said:
That said, perhaps a better way to deal with Saddam might have been to charge him in an international criminal court, but that would deny the Iraqis their right to apply justice as a sovereign state.
My problem would be that Iraq really isn't a sovereign state.
Not in a Weberian sense, if in a legal sense. In real sense it’s still a protectorate. But for the last 60 years we’ve accepted a definition of sovereignty as a legal identity. That’s very problematic. If you want to point at the sovereignty of Iraq as a fraud, and I agree there are plenty of reasons to accept that, than you have to look at every other protectorate (basically France’s African neo-colonies).
I think things will get a bit better when the country has a free and fair election and if the Iraqis can put down the insurrection. But one need not be democratic to be sovereign. It only needs to have a government that is recognized by other countries. Sovereignty has historically been decided by “recognition” more than any empirical standards (monopoly of force, administrative infrastructure, etc).
Those articles boil down to empty rhetoric too, I'm afraid. Even if you can prove that living in Europe radicalized muslims, how can you prove what's causing it?
You argue that Europe radicalizes because we segregate muslims from Europeans in a negative way.
I argue that Europe radicalizes muslims by giving them more freedom to build their own communities than the US does, and gives them more access to any sources they wish.
I'm guessing that the truth is somewhere in the middle. Yes, the situation of muslims in Europe can be pretty bad, but we also have a lot more muslims than you, who group and worship so much that the Rotterdam council had to limit the building of mosques simply because they were cluttering up the city (an act that was blocked by the state, I think)
You’re right. You do have more Muslims than we do. I could say that we have more Latin Americans than you do, but they don’t go flying planes into our buildings. And it’s not because they don’t get the shit deal. My wife was in Texas and she noticed how crappy Whites treat Mexicans. On the other hand, I think that the Islam helps overcome collective action problems and compounds frustrations and radical ideas. I have spoken to some Muslims here and it strikes me that when you take a minority and move that into a society in which it becomes very defensive of it’s culture, it is more like to become radicalized.
The only real way is to talk to Muslims about how they feel. I think those articles do that. I also think that the community has to, sometimes, reflect on itself. This is why, I think, few muslim radicals come out of India. Sure, there are some Muslims in the US who become very defensive and very aggressive. You bombard a person’s foreign culture with alien ideas those cultural values become more a part of that person’s identity.
But this is where I disagree- Ok, we don’t have schools that are just for Muslims, unless they are owned by Muslims. We don’t have neighborhoods that are zoned for Muslims. Muslims do form their own communities, just like every other ethnicity that has come to the US has does. And while they, like everyone else who came to the US, has to put up with some shit in the integration process, they opportunities still exist. Muslims in the US are more or less following the same pattern as Asians did, first generations work and go to school and pursue higher income jobs. We have Muslims from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and a lot of Turks, but also from North Africa and Southeast Asia- they are linked by religion but I don’t think they are especially targeted (until George Bush at least) as a class. They are no different then the Chinese, Filipinos, Latinos, Eastern Euros, Russians, and everybody else that comes in.
I credit that to the rather flexible nature of American national identity, which basically is a mutt- a mongrel dog created by mixing of different breeds of humankind. In Europe, from what I have seen, the identity of nation still matters more. The French care about who is French, the Swiss don’t like non-Swiss and the Germans don’t like Auslanders. In American, for the most part, we really don’t care, and when we do it’s in the clash of city ghettos which act more or less as informal communities until recent immigrants move out.
But come on Kharn, Europe has a long tradition of radicalizing people from the developing world. Is it your educational institutions- perhaps. Many of the leaders of revolutionary movements during the 20th century were educated in Europe. And there is the problem that the Saudis who did crash those planes were radicalized in Europe before coming to the US.
welsh said:
Or you can hide your head in the sand and ignore the problem.
Much like the US is doing? Blaming the 9/11 attacks purely on outside sources is stupid and dangerous.
Purely an external problem- no. But yes, the US had a hand in what happened. We ignored Afghanistan, and we didn’t take the problems of our presence in Saudi Arabia as seriously as we should. We’ve also been too one-sided in the Israeli-Arab problem.
I suspect though, that 9/11 would not have happened if the US would have kept it’s forces off Saudi Arabia and returned to the “over-the-horizon” presence we had before the first Gulf War.
And in that sense, most of the credit for 9/11 has to fall on Osama bin Laden and his ability to utilize his weath to support Muslim terrorism.
And that's not the only things. Segregation and discrimination are in no way a European problem. Yes, in Europe the subjects are terrorist extremist, and that's the hype now, so we pay attention to that. But in the meantime, no attention is paid to the segregated sufferers of discrimination in the US. What's it going to take? A Mexican terrorist attack?
I think a lot of the problems of segregation and discrimination in the US comes up in the face of crime. You have a lot of unemployed youth with time on their hands, little opportunities and access to violence. Ironically the World Bank identified these same variables as being major causes for internal war. The difference is size- criminal gangs are too small and disorganized and driven for private profit to be a political threat. But it’s a social phenomena that this administration has not taken seriously enough.
The answer is not more cops. It’s not even less guns (Gwydion is probably smiling) but jobs and opportunities. The problem is we have a cult that believes that the market can do everything. It can’t do everything. While I think the market should often be left be, we also need to take into consideration of where the market fails. This is why I continue to support affirmative action- a crappy answer at best, but better than nothing.
welsh said:
If you look at the number of attacks by Muslims in Europe, they far outweigh those against the US. Those in the US were more significant in that they picked more noteworthy targets. But for years Muslims have been setting off bombs in France, they captured a embassy in England, they hijacked an Italian cruise ship. They did a lot of things in your backyard.
That's quite a significant difference in size you're talking there, welsh, and remember 9/11 was supposed to be bigger. I think if you tally up all muslim terrorist attacks of the past 10 years in Western Europe, you'll still not reach the number of deaths in the US.
I think that’s correct. Even if you took all terrorists of all makes and models, your Red Brigade, ETA, IRA, Basques, Baader Meinhofs and who ever else- perhaps then you’d have similar numbers, but I doubt it.
We should also remember that there were supposed to be more planes than the 4 that crashed, and that a similar plot was done a few years prior in the Pacific and got foiled.
But in that case I think the targets were mostly Asian nations, not America. I’ll have to check that.
Eastern Europe is another story, because of their history, but you were referring to the rich European countries that breed extermism, not the balkans.
Truely, the bigger problem of Europe is Christian extremists, like the Basques and the Irish.
And I think that’s one of the problems you are going to face with terrorists. There will always be some of them that will commit bizarre and terrible acts of violence to get attention because they believe in some whacko notions. Israelis had to worry about the those groups that wanted to commit acts of violence during the Millenium in the hope of ushering the second coming of Christ.
Whackos.
And then you get a country like Afghanistan where the whackos are breed and trained and were the ideology holds the country together and shelters your Osama’s in part, perhaps, because they provide an added means of violence or easy capital. I mean, is it a surprise that the countries that are supposed to harbor terrorists are mostly on the shitty end of the development scale? And that’s a problem- so far no one has come up with a good argument of how these movements are raised and why? This is about hearts and minds, but also about the belly. If you live in a starving country and are sick and tired of starving and you don’t know why, I think there’s a damn good chance you are going to look for an ideology that will give you something to channel your anger against.
welsh said:
Y'know we have muslim schools with muslim teachers here. I live two blocks away from the Islamic University of Rotterdam. Do you have anything even vaguely comparable to that?
Let me check. However, there are a lot of religious universities in the US. We have Jewish schools, and Evengelical schools. Liberty University is an hour away and is owned by Jerry Falwell and that fucker charges top tuition to his students- oh yes, he’s a religious man so it’s not a profit- bullshit.
Ok, quick yahoo search identifies five but I doubt that’s exclusive-
http://www.schools4us.com/universities.html
There’s also a Islamic University in Chicago.
That said most of our better Universities have some departments on the middle east or have muslim religious studies. From my Uni.
http://faculty.virginia.edu/mesp/ or they can major in Islam in religious studies-
http://www.virginia.edu/religiousstudies/programs/ugrad/themajor.html
and a lot of your better scholars will teach at major universities where salaries are better. I know both Harvard and Yale have Islamic studies.
welsh said:
What, you want me to prove who I teach? As for the Europe articles, I have included them above. I sent you the others but I am not sure if you read them.
No, you keep firing off the "European muslims are worse off than American muslims" or "Americans are so nice to muslims". But you never once came up with a simple, unbiased article with statistics backing it up proving either of these statements. Any article I've ever read on the subject tends to be biased or empty, and every one of them focuses only on Europe, rather than comparing the two.
Ok, Kharn, I will see what I can find for you.
Here’s a book review- but it’s mostly on Europe but it sites to a book. I will probably go into school and will check the ERIC database, and if you like I will email it to you- because I think most of the viewers are tired of reading this.
International Journal of Politics and Ethics, Spring 2002 v2 i1 p83(5)
Muslims in Western Europe: Bridging the Gap between Integration and Marginalization. Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe, Muslim Communities in the New Europe, A Heart Turned East: Among the Muslims of Europe and America, To Be a European Muslim: A Study of Islamic Sources in the European Context. (Review Essay). (Book Review)_(book review) Robert J. Pauly Jr..
The tragic events of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath have engendered a renewed interest among scholars and laymen alike in the Islamic religion generally and the relationship between Muslims and adherents to the Christian and Jewish faiths specifically. As a result, the popularity of two classes of scholarly works in particular--those addressing the extent to which (1) an emerging clash of Islamic and Western civilizations or (2) the growing presence of Muslims in the West will become defining 21st century issues--has increased markedly. Notwithstanding the significance of the former issue, the latter is perhaps of greater relevance, most notably as relates to the present and future impact of Islamic communities on society and governance in Western Europe, which is home to nearly 15 million Muslims, including as many as six million in France, 3.3 million in Germany and two million in the United Kingdom.
Islam is currently the second largest faith in terms of membership among the collective populations of the member states of the European Union (EU}-and also perhaps the least well understood. In addition to possessing the highest growth rates in the region, Muslim communities are more economically, politically and socially marginalized than is true of any other Western European minority group. This is most glaringly evident in the French, German and British cases, where the majority of Muslims are of North African, Turkish and South Asian ethnic persuasion, respectively. In each context, governments of both the left and the right have consistently failed to develop effective means to fully integrate Muslims into their societies, a shortcoming that has the potential to threaten both domestic and international security and political stability through manifestations of civil unrest such as the series of riots that emanated from Pakistani communities across north-central England in the spring and summer of 2001. The books under consideration here address these complex issues in comparable but not identical fashions, with the former three works focusing on a series of domestic case studies and the fourth taking a more regional approach. This piece covers the initial three first--emphasizing the chapters on France, Germany and the United Kingdom given that these states house the majority of Muslims residing in Western Europe and are also the most politically and economically influential in the EU--then evaluates the fourth, before concluding with a set of prescriptions to help reduce minority-majority tensions across the region in the future.
Nonneman, Niblock and Szajkowski divide their edited volume into sections on Eastern and Western Europe. Drawing on case studies ranging from the Balkans to the shores of the Atlantic--the chapters by Steven Vertovec on the United Kingdom, Jim House on France, and Nonneman and Yasemin Karakasoglu on Germany are the most relevant here-the editors reach six general conclusions with respect to the Muslims of Europe. First, they have not participated significantly in the political economies of their countries of residence. Second, socio-economic marginalization has had a marked impact upon their relationships with members of the societal majority. Third, there is not a significant difference in Catholic and Protestant attitudes toward Muslim communities in Christian-majority states. Fourth, Muslims' economic predicaments in Europe are similar to those faced by their counterparts in the Greater Middle East. Fifth, their level of political engagement is greatest in those countries in which they face the fewest hur dles to citizenship. Sixth, the level of awareness and expression of Muslim identity has risen appreciably across the European continent over the past quarter century.
In examining the British context, Vertovec stresses the significance of the emergence of Muslim-run institutions such as the Bradford Council of Mosques and Muslim Parliament in the 1980s and 1990s, astutely noting that these developments demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses of Islamic communal activism. For instance, while the former group proved effective in lobbying Bradford officials to accommodate Muslim religious needs in the city's schools in the early 1980s, it also buttressed popular misperceptions of Islam as a radical, anti-Western faith by staging a public burning of author Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses in January 1989 on the premise that the work denigrated the character of the prophet Muhammad. In addition, Vertovec correctly acknowledges the marginalization of Muslims, whose communities are located almost exclusively in low-income housing projects along the peripheries of major metropolitan areas, but does not offer the requisite economic statistics to back his assertions more forcefully.
House paints a somewhat clearer picture than Vertovec in describing both the development and characteristics of Franco-Muslim communities, tracing their historical roots in North Africa and identifying their ethnic, generational, socio-religious and political diversity in contemporary France. Notwithstanding his failure to provide any statistical data detailing the exclusion of Muslims from the societal mainstream--a mention of unemployment rates nearly three times the national average during the 1990s would suffice--House posits three particularly strong arguments in explaining the underlying causes of such travails. First, the diversity of Muslim communities has mitigated the capacity of their leaders to forge the necessary common sense of identity to develop effective local or regional, let alone national, political lobbying organizations.
Second, despite that diversity, the innate clash between French secularism and the transcendent nature of Islam-whether real or perceived--has engendered mutual senses of distrust between Muslims and members of the societal majority. Third, the legacy of French colonialism continues to complicate the minority integration process in France, most notably so as a result of Paris's linkages to the military-backed regimes which have governed Algeria in recent decades.
Similar to House's contribution, the Nonneman and Karakasoglu piece emphasizes the heterogeneity of Germany's Muslim population, alluding to deep political divisions between the Turks and Kurds that account for more than two-thirds of the adherents to Islam residing in the Federal Republic. Nonnemm and Karakasoglu do a considerably better job than either Vertovec or House in structuring their chapter, presenting a concise accounting of the establishment of Islamic communities in Germany through a series of government-sponsored guest worker programs in the aftermath of World War II, before shifting to an examination of the Federal Republic's inability to effectively integrate Muslims into society over the past two decades, which they attribute largely to discriminatory citizenship laws and the inflexibility of German regional education officials. Ultimately, however, the authors--as is also true of Vertovec and House--neither suggest a clear means to overcome these integrative shortcomings or denote the poten tial long-term social and political consequences of failing to do so.
In contrast to the edited volume, Kepel limits his work to sections on three countries-the United States, the United Kingdom and France-of which only the last two are instructive here. Three themes transcend the monograph generally and the chapters on the French and British contexts specifically. First, the advocacy of a clash of civilizations model of international relations by some American and European scholars and policy-makers as a replacement for the East vs. West strategic framework of the Cold War has undermined relationships between Muslim minorities and the societal majorities of states in the Western world. Second, related increases in the marginalization of those minorities have driven many British- and French-born second- and third-generation Muslims to respond to perceived majority rejection by turning to Islamic fundamentalism with potentially violent and destabilizing consequences. Third, manifestations of this trend include the aforementioned Rushdie affair and the widespread Muslim backlash against the decision of French education officials to exclude three North African girls from classes for wearing their traditional Islamic headscarves (foulards) in September 1989.
Kepel's section on the United Kingdom is both well organized and reasonably comprehensive in that it traces the development of Muslim communities from their genesis in migratory flows from South Asia in the 1950s and 1960s to their shifts in demographic character by virtue of a wave of family reunifications in the 1970s and the growth of Britishborn second and third generations in the 1980s and 1990s. The author properly gives credence to the impact of Muslims' roots in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh on their present religious and ethnic identities but dwells too long on this issue at the expense of a deeper examination of the socio-economic characteristics of South Asian communities in contemporary Britain. His treatment of the minority integration process is confined to a review of legislation designed both to limit the rights of foreign-born residents within and gradually stem the flow of immigrants to the United Kingdom in the 1960s and 1970s and an entirely valid indictment of the government's ill-conce ived policy of multiculturalism, which is foolishly based upon coexistence rather than reconciliation.
Kepel's section on France is considerably stronger. His review of the rising influence of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria in the 1980s and 1990s--though somewhat longwinded-is instructive as much of that group's support is drawn from the same strain of disillusionment prevalent among the Muslim youths that populate the low-income suburbs (banlieues) ringing French cities such as Paris, Lyon and Marseilles. He considers the foulard affair as a defining event in the troubled relationship between Muslims and the French government, one that has helped to "create a favorable environment for re-Islamization movements among young [North African] beurs" (p. 153). When coupled with the failure of domestic Muslim leaders to establish effective multiethnic political organizations, this trend has the potential to render beurs more vulnerable to recruitment by transnational terrorist groups, which is a particularly frightening reality in light of the September 11 attacks.
In contrast to the Kepel monograph and the volume edited by Nonneman and his colleagues, Lebor draws on his career as a journalist in presenting an account of the plight of Muslims in the West that is long on enlightening interviews and personal observations but short on scholarly analysis. While Lebor's book includes chapters on contexts as geographically wide-ranging as Turkey and the United States, his accounts of Islam in Britain, France and Germany are the most useful in adding Muslim perspectives to the analytical frameworks in the aforementioned works. Three themes transcend each of these chapters. First, the diversity of Western European Muslim communities belies Western misperceptions of Islam as a threatening, monolithic faith. Second, economic exclusion is the principal source of Muslim resentment of Western governments generally and those based in London, Paris and Berlin specifically. Third, continued Muslim-Christian hostility has the potential to threaten Western European internal security and social and political stability in the future.
Lebor astutely describes the ethnic, generational, political and denominational diversity of Islamic communities through a series of interviews with Muslims ranging from radical political dissidents and religious fundamentalists and modernists in London, to a Francophile mosque rector in Paris to a German-born rap musician of Turkish descent in Berlin. After presenting the contrasting viewpoints of Muslim fundamentalists and modernists in the United Kingdom, for example, the author notes that as is true of "Islam everywhere, British Islam is a mosaic, a complicated pattern of different components" (p.133). Lebor finds similar parallels in the French and German contexts, where second and third generation Muslims in particular have struggled to forge identities that bridge the chasm between the developing countries of their parents' birth to the Western European societies in which they were raised but have yet to gain full acceptance. All of these points are credible. However, he fails either to propose a means to redress the integrative shortcomings faced by Muslims or to elaborate on the ways such problems can threaten the continent's domestic and regional stability. A series of terrorist bombings in France in 1995 and the 2001 riots in north-central England, for instance, are two striking examples of the latter.
With respect to the integration issue, Ramadan, a Muslim of Egyptian descent raised in the United Kingdom, does an excellent job in suggesting ways in which his fellow adherents to Islam can play more constructive public roles in states across the EU. His book is divided into sections that (1) provide interpretations of the Koran catered to Muslims residing in the West and (2) offer prescriptions for political action that will help to more fully integrate Islam into EU member societies. Notwithstanding the esoteric nature of the initial section (especially from the perspectives of members of other faiths), it serves as the basis for three particularly instructive points that Ramadan raises in the latter section. First, Muslims can adhere to the basic tenets of the Koran and still lead active social and political lives in Western Europe. Second, the onus for the pursuit of integrative progress through these means lies primarily with members of the second and third generations born and raised in countries such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Third, such progress also requires an increased willingness on behalf of members of the Christian majority--both inside and outside of government--to interact cooperatively with Muslims.
Ultimately, Ramadan sets four goals that Muslims must accomplish in order "to succeed in the challenge of a coexistence which would not be peace in separation but living together in participation" (p. 219). First, the enhancement of introcommunal Islamic dialogue, principally at the local but also at the national and supranational levels. Second, the short-term mitigation and eventual elimination of financial and political dependence upon external entities--whether national, international or transnational in orientation--by Western European Muslims. Third, the development of more effective organizations to undertake Islamic communal action at the continental level generally and in the French, German and British contexts in particular. Fourth, the pursuit of greater political participation by Muslims in the related Western European electoral and governmental processes.
While Ramadan's arguments are directed primarily toward Muslims, his work is equally useful as a means to dispel popular myths among policy-makers and the public at large of Islam's innate incompatibility with Western European societal norms. Similarly, the edited volume put forth by Nonneman, Niblock and Szajkowski, and the monographs written by Kepel and Lebor, are produced with distinct audiences in mind--scholars focusing on the issue of Islam in the West in the former two cases, and government officials and Muslim communal leaders in the latter instance--the themes they address are also likely to prove palatable for members of the general population struggling to gain a better understanding of Islam and its adherents in the aftermath of the events of September 11.
Collectively, the authors raise one overarching theme--the integration of Muslims into the societies of EU member states-that is in dire need of further consideration by a scholarly community that has to date been consumed with more high profile issues such as transatlantic cooperation, European integration, and national and supranational leadership. Using their arguments as a point of departure, the concluding five points provide a road map for consideration of the present and future place of Islam in Western Europe. First, the vast majority of Muslims residing in contemporary France, Germany and the United Kingdom are presently excluded from the benefits of full acceptance by members of the societal mainstreams of those states. Second, in each case, the proportions of Muslims in the population are rising and projected to continue to do so in the future. Thus, the need to integrate Muslims will not disappear of its own accord. Third, as a result, government leaders must fully recognize and openly acknowledge the relevance of present integrative shortcomings and work to more equitably incorporate Muslims into the French, German and British societies and embrace that challenge with renewed vigor. Fourth, they must attack the problem locally first rather than regionally or nationally given that the implications of the marginalization of Muslims are most pronounced in the municipalities where Islamic communities are situated. Fifth, ignoring or downgrading the significance of these issues will only increase the potential for further social and political instability fostered by the exclusion of Muslims and is thus not a viable option.
Named Works: Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe (Book); Muslim Communities in the New Europe (Book); A Heart Turned East: Among the Muslims of Europe and America (Book); To Be a European Muslim: A Study of Islamic [ources in the European Context (Book)
Right now I am looking for more on the Muslim population in the US but here’s another article- the interesting issue is that while there was a bump up in discrimination, Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans are politically active and benefit from relatively high incomes. So far it seems we have about 5 million Muslims in the US, and while the administration has been discriminatory, for the most part this population lacks the marginalization found Europe. Furthermore, so far when I researched the issue of discrimination and marginalization of Muslim societies, the case studies keep pointing to Europe, suggesting that the social discrimination in the US is non-issue. One article made the argument that Muslims and Arabs have benefitted from the Civil Rights Movement in the US of the 60s and 70s, thus the ethnic battles alright fought have deligitimized ethnic or religious discrimination.
That said, I think it foolish to assume that Muslims don’t suffer discrimination on the basis that just about every ethnic group in the US suffers discrimination. Do they receive more discrimination or are they specifically targeted? No.
Some data-
http://www.islam101.com/history/population2_usa.html
There is an anti- arab discrimination organization-
http://www.adc.org/
Brookings Review, Wntr 2002 v20 i1 p14(2)
Arab and Muslim America: a snapshot. Shibley Telhami.
Full Text: COPYRIGHT 2002 Brookings Institution
In a New York Times article appearing a week after the horror befell America on September 11, a Muslim woman her dilemma this way: "I am so used to thinking myself as a New Yorker that it took me a few days begin to see myself as a stranger might: a Muslim woman, an outsider, perhaps an enemy of the city. Before last week, I had thought of myself as a lawyer, a feminist, a wife, a sister, a friend, a woman on the street. Now I begin to see myself as a brown woman who bears a vague resemblance to the images of terrorists we see on television and in the newspapers. I can only imagine how much more difficult it is for men who look like Mohamed Atta or Osama bin Laden."
Excruciating moments like those the nation experienced last September test the identity of all Americans, but especially those whose identity may be caught in the middle. Many Arab and Muslim Americans lost loved ones and friends in the attacks in New York and Washington, and others had loved ones dispatched to Afghanistan as American soldiers to punish those who perpetrated the horror (Muslims are the largest minority religion in the U.S. armed forces). But many also had double fears for their own children. On the one hand, they shared the fears of all Americans about the new risks of terror; on the other, they were gripped by the haunting fear of the children being humiliated in school for who they are.
Two Partially Overlapping Communities
There is much that's misunderstood about Arabs and Muslims in America. Although the two communities share great deal, they differ significantly in their make-up. Most Arabs in America are not Muslim, and most Muslims are not Arabs. Most Arab Americans came from Lebanon and Syria, in several waves of immigration beginning at the outset of the 20th century. Most Muslim Americans are African American or from South Asia. Many of the early Arab immigrants assimilated well in American society. Arab-American organizations are fond of highlighting prominent Americans of at least partial Arab descent: Ralph Nader, George Mitchell, John Sununu, Donna Shalala, Spencer Abraham, Bobby Rahal, Doug Flutie, Jacques Nasser, Paul Anka, Frank Zappa, Paula Abdul, among many others. Like other ethnic groups in America, Arabs and Muslims have produced many successful Americans whose ethnic background is merely an afterthought.
Arab Americans now number more than 3 million, Muslims roughly 6 million (though estimates range from 3 million to 10 million). The income of Arab Americans is among the highest of any American ethnic group--second only to that of Jewish Americans. Arab Americans have become increasingly politicized over the years. According to a recent survey, proportionately more Arab Americans contribute to presidential candidates than any other ethnic group--and the groups surveyed included Asian Americans, Italian Americans, African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Jewish Americans.
Over the past decade especially, Arab-American political clout has increased. Although Arab Americans were long shunned by political candidates, President Clinton became the first sitting president to speak at conferences of Arab-American organizations, and both President Clinton and President Bush have normalized ongoing consultations with Arab- and Muslim-American leaders. In the fall 2000 election, presidential candidates sought
the support of Arab Americans, not only for campaign contributions, but also as swing voters in key states, especially Michigan. The September 11 tragedy, coming just as Arab-American political clout was ascendant, had provided a real test for the community's role in American society and politics.
Impact of September 11
For Arab and Muslim leaders, the terrorist crisis has been like no other. It has forced them to contemplate profoundly their identity. Are they Arabs and Muslims living in America, or are they Americans with Arab and Muslim background? The answer came within hours after the terrorist attacks. Major Arab and Muslim organizations issued statements strongly condemning the attacks, refusing to allow their typical frustrations with issues of American policy in the Middle East to become linked to their rejection of the terror. Rarely have Arab and Muslim organizations in the United States been so assertive.
The enormity of the horror, the Middle Eastern background of the terrorists, and the terrorists' attempt to use religion to justify their acts have inevitably led to episodes of discrimination against Arabs and Muslims, as well as against those, such as Sikhs, who resemble them. But the support that both Arabs and Muslims received from thousands of people and organizations far outweighed the negative reaction. Arab and Muslim organizations were flooded with letters and calls of empathy from leaders and ordinary Americans, including many Jewish Americans,for most understood that at stake were the civil liberties of all Americans.
There is more to the article if you like.
However, this hardly suggests a marginalized population. Do they suffer discrimination, sure. But so do most ethnic groups and they are both active and assertive in responding to that. In otherwords, they’re treated like everyone else is.
Also
http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/news/news.php?article=6410
Why do immigrants come?
Immigrants from the Arab world come for the same reason all immigrants come — economic opportunity, opportunities to have an education, to develop a professional career," said Helen Samhan, executive director of the Arab American Institute Foundation, a research group.
So Arabs and Muslims are going through basically the same immigration/integration experience most Americans have gone through. Although admittedly, the current administration is making it more difficult for them.
However, this hardly suggests a marginalized population. Do they suffer discrimination,
sure. But so do most ethnic groups and they are both active and assertive in responding to that. In otherwords, they’re treated like everyone else is.
Here’s a Frontline piece on muslims in the US.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/muslims/portraits/us.html
This part- on the problems between Muslim and African-Americans who convert to Islam, is interesting and part of the problem in defining Muslims in the US.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/muslims/interviews/wadud.html
(and by the way, all this digging up info is cutting into my game playing time).
Oh wait- here’ s a comparison-
http://www.csis.org/islam/islamineurope.pdf
I have scanned through some of this, and it looks fairly representative. As for comparative surveys- so far it’s the best. But I’ll keep looking.
And that's pointless. They're just making Europe sound bad, without even pointing to a "this is how to do it, because the US is doing better"
Ok, I think the above cite does that fairly well. Interesting stuff too- because it also traces this to the character of both US and European muslim populations.
welsh said:
Hey man, I sent you the studies. It’s your choice whether you want to ignore them.
Are you talking about a while ago? I think I've read everything you mailed me, but I might be wrong.
Yes, I either mailed them to you or I cited them in the last time we had this discussion. Not sure if it was on the old board.
welsh said:
You get Muslims, we get Latin Americans. Happily our Latin Americans generally don’t fly airplanes into buildings. Your Muslims do.
That somehow means our treatment is wrong and yours is right? As if segregated and abused Latin Americans don't lead to troubles.
Actually when I was in San Diego I was a bit concerned that most of the lower-end jobs were done by Hispanics, but Hispanics make up the majority of the lower-income populations (there were few blacks).
That said, as stated, so far I can think of no acts of terrorism committed by Latin Americans inside the US. Why? Because there are a lot of Latin’s who have middle income and upper income jobs. It’s an immigrant wave coming to a country based on immigrant waves. They usually get the low-income jobs and then work up.
welsh said:
As for the article- you did note that the people being deported were illegal immigrants, right?
(...)
Now, being married to an immigrant I don’t like the US INS rules, and have posted so here. But that said, how would the US not deport these people if they broke law? If we didn’t deport them would that be fair to anyone else who is here illegally? Or should we just give them all amnesty. (And for the record, I often think the amnesty thing is best- especially as 20% of the new jobs are going to illegals anyway).
But they are not being deported because of their faith but because they are here illegally.
The whole "register please...oh wait you're illegal lets boot you" is not only pretty assholic, it's also obviously a front to kick out people you don't like. Muslims.
Assuming we don’t like Muslims of course- never mind that the Muslims and Arab populations are among the highest earning in the US. I know a few students who just got into CIA who are Muslim, but also a US citizen and she’s not alone. So it’s not like we are discriminating against Muslims, just non-citizens. Note, and the fact that my wife is not a citizen means I couldn’t go CIA if I wanted to.
Perhaps. The country has gotten security nutty, and the fact that a couple of the guys who did Sept 11 where in the US illegally has made the US more restrictive on immigration policy. I think it’s largely a bad idea. My wife has trouble getting her folks to come from Brazil, and I have a friend who can’t get his wife back from Turkey.
But the thing is, these guys were here illegally, and now are getting booted out. Same thing happens if an illegal gets caught in the criminal situation- if he gets off, he gets sent home.
Sucks for them. Really. Our immigration policies are too tough and unfair, but is this really targeted racism or religious discrimination- no.
welsh said:
That makes little sense. The US doesn’t usually ask a person when they come in “are you an extremist” although it might ask if the person plans to attack the US through sabatoge or violence. And some people lie.
Considering how easy it is to sneak into the US, it would be near impossible to keep extremists out. That’s why so many of the illegals or those without visas getting caught are being thrown in detention- which I will agree is an awful policy, but that’s George Bush’s War on Terrorism for you.
Look, the US has strict entry tests and requirements, it's no coincidence that there're more immigrants from farther reaches of the world in Europe than in the US, and it's no real coincidence that those that get into the US love the country to bits.
It’s gotten more difficult for sure.
Now if you claim asylum status you are sent to detention, in the old days you were sent free and disappeared into the fabric of society. But most of the Brazilians I meet in the US are here illegally. They come with a visa and a ticket to go home, and they never take the ticket home. Fairly standard. I would go to say that if you looked at most ethnic organizations in the US where the people come from developing countries, at least half are illegal. When I was in law school working as a busboy, the entire staff of the kitchen came from Latin America, and not a green card among them.
So in the aftermath the country got more serious and INS became part of Homeland Security.
And most of the illegals don’t want to go home. Go to Mexico City and you can see why. So yes, once they are here and they are able to find some way of staying here, they love the country to bits. Why? Because a poor person in Brazil doing the same job in the US lives better, practically the standard of living of a middle class person from Brazil. Even if they plan to go home, they can make more money illegally in the US as a Pizza maker than they could at home, and can go home and open a business.
Really, being married to a Brazilian with ties to the communities is an eye opener.
welsh said:
Now, now. Let’s not get too happy. You still have your Nazis and we still have our KKK. There are plenty of extremists to go around for everyone.
Aye, but that's Christian extremism. That isn't a problem. You do realise Bush quietly passed a statement and maybe even acts to narrow the gap between church (church, not mosque) and state, right?
Yes, Bush’s moves to support faith based initiatives have gone to Christian organizations (which are remarkably republican). That was mentioned on the Frontline link and the video I posted earlier on another thread. Of course it helps that he’s evangelical and that the evangelicals will vote Republican. Yes, it’s not good. Happily the Muslims and Arabs will probably go Democrat. Ideally, so will the Catholics.
And remember when Tone was saying that more church and state was a good thing? And how I said that was pretty fucked up?
welsh said:
You are getting rude. Kharn that’s not fair and is a fallicous argument. You are reducing this to a simple question of a false alternatives. I have not said Europe is evil. I have said that you are less responsible for yourselves than you should be, and that you point your finger at the US instead of looking at yourselves.
Actually, read your message. There was hardly a single statement in there about bad things done by the US. You named plently of examples of terrible things done by Europe, ignoring the fact that the US did pretty comparable things. Excuse me for reading that as a loose "Europe bad America good" post.
No actually if you have read the post, and remember many of my earlier posts, I have said the US has done lots of nasty things in the world.
What galls me is when Europeans say, “Bad US, bad US.” And (1) profit from it, and (2) live in countries that do the same damn thing.
Yes, yes, I know you were just reacting to Blade, but I was reacting in the same sentiment.
I know, you get all Euro-defensive.
But there is a deeper point. That mess in Yugoslavia was a real fuck up, and a poor showing for European leadership. Germany recognizing Slovenia sovereignty accelerated the entire fragmentation of Yugoslavia. France protecting Bosnian Serbs who had made a great reputation for as ethnic cleansers? And how much grief have you sent to Vlad Putin lately for the crap he brings down with in Russa or the “near abroad?” Not much.
I like the idea, really, of the US sharing the world leadership with Europe. Better Europe than China. And I think a friendly two-pole world is possible, especially when you consider how much capital and trade goes between the US and Europe.
I would just like to see the Europeans take more responsibility on the global stage.
Now a cynic might say that all the US actions are self-interested, and if you look hard enough you could construct some notion of self-interest in some way. For instance US help in Bangladesh when they suffer a typhoon is a move to keep other influences out- right. US support in Somalia was to create another puppet- don’t think so. So maybe there are some things that a country does just because it is “the right thing to do.”
What I’d like to see is Europe doing a bit more of that. Not to say it doesn’t. I know Norwegian troops go on UN missions all the time.
But maybe I just don’t get enough of that news on this side of the Atlantic. But sometimes it seems, as Alec said, Europe is only interested in making itself rich and otherwise, hides it’s head in the sand.
If that’s the case, it’s a problem. If you’re going to preach values, then you have to act that way. I say the same thing for the Americans. But the Europeans could do the same, and maybe, show a bit more leadership that way.
And incidently, Brit PM Major’s deploying troops to protect the Kurds after the first Gulf War was a kick ass example of exactly that when Bush was farting around on that issue.
Brits in Sierre Leone putting down that mess is another example.
But try to get some Europeans to go to the Congo (Belgium) to stop that civil war- forget it. And it’s your old colony, it’s your oppressive administrative infrastructure they inherited. So maybe you are a bit at fault there? Is it so hard then, when millions of people are dieing, to show a little balls and take responsibility?
If the EU is to take center stage in the world, it has to do it by doing more than getting rich and exploiting the world (and fair the US does that too) and maybe do the “right thing” once and awhile.
(and French protection of the guys who committed the Rawanda genocide doesn’t count).
welsh said:
Reflection is hard. I can see why the Dutch often look at the Dutch East India Company as a great moment and ignore the atrocities
Uhm, actually, the first two things you are told about the Golden Age of Holland are these:
1. It might've been a Golden Age, but there was a helluva lot of poverty in Holland.
2. We got our riches by oppressing, abusing and murdering the Indonesians
When the Dutch look back at the Golden Age with a feeling of pride, it's because we were the most powerful country in the world. That does not mean we're not concious of what we did there.
Fair enough Kharn. To be honest, when most of us in the US learn about the migration west we learn about Manifest Destiny- or how our religious idealism leads to conquest, and (2) how we commit genocide against the Indians.
So we get a bit of guilt tripping in elementary school too.
Tho' I will say all the European former colonial powers have the habit of glossing over the acts in the colonial countries. This is bad, but hey, it's not like the US doesn't do the same for its history.
Actually we don’t spend enough time talking about Latin America in high school, although Teddy gets a bad rap for Panama. Other periods we tend to gloss over as well.
welsh said:
Of course it was a real smart move of the Russians to put missiles in Cuba in the first place or pledge that it would support any country in Latin American that had a communist revolution. And don’t be so harsh on Kennedy. When his advisors where saying let’s do a surgical bombing strike, Kennedy said no- why, because he had just read the Guns of August and didn’t want to feel like the Germans.
Aye, you can spot a good president because he's swayed by a book
No, but I appreciate the fact that he took the more diplomatic choice when it came to going to war. Unlike the current idiot. But then notice that Bush is less bellicose with North Korea. Lesson- if you don’t want the US to fuck with you, get a nuke, but make sure no one knows about it.
Man, the world got off narrow during the Cuban crisis. It would've come off a lot less narrow if the President hadn't been a warmongering nutjob. It would have also come off a lot less narrow if the Soviet Leader was more like the oldskool Stalin.
Yes, it was bad. Had we airstriked, the Russians would have hit Turkey- thus NATO Art 5 means global war. Had we invaded, the Russian brigade had tactical nukes it could have used, thus a muchroom cloud visible for Miami.
The odd thing was that McNamara, in the early part of the conference says, “strategically, those nukes don’t really matter.” Which is kind of true in a strategic way, but not in a political way. Kennedy was worried about (1) appearing to have no balls, and (2) Russian influence in Latin America.
But those were the days of the Cold War when military and political leaders both thought that the war was inevitable. Pretty spooky that kind of cynicism.
welsh said:
Perhaps. The Indian ocean had a strong merchant trade before the Europeans showed up and conquered it with cannon. There were a number of states in Africa that were powerful sovereigns before the Europeans showed up. Your primary advantages were guns and disease. A common argument now is that those colonies and the colonial administrations inherited by post-colonial states are reverting back to more ancient forms of politics. However, most of the colonized suffered in quality of life when they were colonized, and they have since hurt even more.
They were hurting when we got there. Colonisations gave the colonized countries roads, railways, technology, teachings, healthcare and democracy on a level unknown before we got there. Like it or not, if you take just two loose points in history and ignore the atrocities of the colonization, the colonized countries did improve in status.
Yes they were hurting- in Africa because of the slave trade, in Asia?
I used to argue the same thing Kharn. But the more you look at it, the more it works against you.
Except for the fact that the railways were used to further exploitation of natural resources and primary commodities which were used to further exploit and repress after colonialism ended.
Technology – was never as good as what the metropolitan states had on purpose- the metropolis didn’t want competition. And most of that technology was simply to further exploit natural resources and agricultural commodities.
Healthcare- came about in the Congo when the Belgians figured out that Leopold had killed so many Congolese (or just chopped off their arms because they couldn’t deliver rubber) that they lacked the indigenous labor to make a profit. So healthcare was used to sustain a dominated population of virtual slaves.
Democracy!- ha, Ok, no most of the African states had some democracy, but there was no administration and the first thing the winning party did was to outlaw or repress the opposition- since democracy needs at two changes of leadership, most of those states never made it. India- ok, but then there was that partition and a few million dead in the process? Other democracies?
Ok add one- links to international markets- through companies that were still in the hands of metrop businesses and dependent on the developed states for marketing. Former colonies didn’t start nationalizing until the 1970s and that generally failed to work out for them- exception being the middle east.
welsh said:
"]Ah France, the country that showed up at the last minute. Because it had a score to settle with the English and in those days wars were acceptable diplomacy, same rules that led you to World War 1 and World War 2.
Yeah, showed up at the last minute. Kinda reminds me of another country in two other wars.
Yes, I agree, the US can only take some credit in turning the tide in the First World War but that was only after the German’s last great offensive came to a stand still.
However, World War 2, 1941 is two years into the war, and four more to go. Plus we were giving supplies to the Allies earlier in both wars.
welsh said:
Actually the French were still interested in supporting Mobutu and were pissed off when the Rawandans supporting Kabila, knocked him out of office.
So? The US has kept on oppressive regimes they instated for a long, long time after the Cold War, with the difference that unlike France, nobody could really criticize the US. Two striking examples are the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. Yes, you did something against Hussein, later on, but you did fuckall against the Taliban until the Afghanistan War.
True to some extent, wrong in others. The US has been supporting democratization in much of Latin America, and even stuck it’s nose in it in South Korea, told the Filipino leadership to leave when there was a revolution there too. The Taliban, like it or not, where the only real government in Afghanistan to maintain order. Plus they had some pretty spiffy policies regarding opium. As for Saddam, we supported him when he fought the Iranians, but didn’t do much after that. Mostly because he was the big bully in the middle east and we wanted to keep him happy. Then he got greedy and we pushed him down. Most of the weapons that Saddam has are former Soviet.
And don’t forget Iraq used to be in the French sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf.
welsh said:
Not sure what that refers to. We grew fat because we grew rich and lazy, and because we don’t walk to much and give too many subsidies to corn. As for England, we fought them twice, but then they decided to enforce our Monroe Doctrine and we’ve been buddies ever since (well except for a hick up during the US Civil War).
You think you could've dealt with England as easily if it didn't have other things, like the Napoleonatic wars, on its mind? Do you really think that if England cared, it couldn't have just grabbed the coastal lines of the US and left it at that?
I think the Brits played smart. It figured it could profit off Latin America and not have to pay the price of colonial administration. The lose of colonies of Spain worked to it’s advantage and so it was getting into the business of indirect empire. They got to export a lot of capital to Latin America knowing that the European powers would not get to reconquer those lands. Which is why so much of English policy revolves around the Bank of England and the flow of capital.
As for the coastal lines, the Brits were doing that before the War of 1812. While they won most of that war, we did win that peace. But as you point out, there were the French.
Europe has done the same. Pakistan springs to mind, doesn't it?
However, you miss my points. The US did not back up Taiwan out of noble sentiments.
I hardly think trade with Taiwan is worth losing Los Angeles in a war. In fact, I think if the Chinese want to strut in the Pacific, then maybe the US should let them. Instead the US continues to monitor the sea lanes, and continues to defend Taiwan. We like the Taiwanese. We have an old relationship with them, and part of that is business.
But the question is, is it worth getting between these two if there is a war. Economically, no. Not when the Chinese have sub-launched ballistic missiles that the can take out our cities from a few hundred miles off our coast.
Yet that’s policy.
As for Pakistan- it was a lot of US aid and protection that kept the Pakistanis happy when the Russians were in Afghanistan. It has also been US influence that has helped moderate Pakistan and India when they start getting testy.